Reconceptualizing Non-Article Iii Tribunals by Dodge, Jaime
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2015
Reconceptualizing Non-Article Iii Tribunals
Jaime Dodge
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Dodge, Jaime, "Reconceptualizing Non-Article Iii Tribunals" (2015). Minnesota Law Review. 250.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/250
DODGE_5fmt 1/25/2015 1:04 PM 
 
905 
Article 
Reconceptualizing Non-Article III 
Tribunals 
Jaime Dodge† 
INTRODUCTION  
Article III is so fundamental to our system of government 
that no body—not Congress or the Executive, nor even the judi-
ciary itself—has the constitutional authority to consent to the 
removal of the judicial power to another branch.1 Even the 
“mildest . . . intrusion” could “compromise the integrity of the 
system of separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that 
system, even with respect to challenges that may seem innocu-
ous at first blush.”2 Yet, the modern Article III doctrine facially 
contradicts this guarantee. Rather than prohibiting any incur-
sion,3 the existing doctrine instructs courts to weigh the en-
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 1. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011). 
 2.  Id. at 2620; accord Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 
478 U.S. 833, 848 (1986) (describing the crucial role of Article III in protecting 
“‘the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tri-
partite government’ and [further safeguarding] litigants’ ‘right to have claims 
decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branch-
es of government’” (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 
U.S. 568, 583 (1985))). 
 3.  Schor, 478 U.S. at 856–57; accord Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 590–91 
(“[T]he requirements of Art. III must in proper circumstances give way to ac-
commodate plenary grants of power to Congress to legislate with respect to 
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croachment on Article III values by non-Article III tribunals.4 
What could prompt this acquiescence, given the importance the 
Court has attached to strict preservation of Article III?  
The Supreme Court expressly rooted its doctrine in a 
pragmatic accommodation of the modern administrative state.5 
The Court identified the added value of specialized adjudica-
tors,6 incorporation of appropriate dispute resolution (ADR)7 
mechanisms,8 and streamlined procedure9 as unique benefits of 
non-Article III tribunals.10 Recognizing the connection between 
substance and procedure, the Court held that non-Article III 
tribunals thus aided Congress in attaining the substantive 
goals of its regulatory regime.11 Unable to accommodate these 
 
specialized areas.” (citing Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389, 407–08 
(1973))). 
 4.  See Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 587–88, 593–94; see also Schor, 478 
U.S. at 856–57. 
 5.  Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (“In determining [whether] . . . a non-Article 
III tribunal impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial 
Branch, the Court has declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules. . . . 
[Such rules] might . . . unduly constrict Congress’ ability to take needed and 
innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers.”); Union Carbide, 473 U.S. 
at 589 (describing Article III doctrine as reflecting “a pragmatic understand-
ing” of the separation of powers). 
 6.  See Schor, 478 U.S. at 845–46. 
 7. Here, the term “appropriate dispute resolution” is used instead of “al-
ternative dispute resolution” in keeping with the modern scholarly consensus 
that the focus of ADR is upon selecting the right mechanism for resolving dis-
putes, and the recognition that almost all disputes are ultimately resolved not 
through dispositive motion practice or trial but through the “alternative” 
methods of mediation and negotiation—inverting the traditional conception of 
which mechanism is the alternative and which is the general rule. See, e.g., 
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 668, 672 (1986) (introducing “appropriate dispute resolution” 
terminology); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Begets Dis-
putes of Its Own: Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 
1871, 1871 (1997) (acknowledging the transition from the use of the term “al-
ternative” to “appropriate dispute resolution”).  
 8.  Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 594 (“To hold otherwise would be to erect 
a rigid and formalistic restraint on the ability of Congress to adopt innovative 
measures such as negotiation and arbitration with respect to rights created by 
a regulatory scheme.”). 
 9. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46 (1932) (“To hold otherwise would be 
to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continu-
ous, expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact 
which are peculiarly suited to examination and determination by an adminis-
trative agency specially assigned to that task.”). 
 10.  Schor, 478 U.S. at 856–57. 
 11.  See id., at 847–48; Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 589–90. 
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structures within the traditional, categorical approach,12 the 
Supreme Court created a new balancing test in which the in-
cursion on Article III values is weighed against the benefits of 
non-Article III adjudication in aiding Congress in attaining its 
substantive regulatory aims.13 
But Congress, by definition, did not create the causes of ac-
tion that arise under state or common law.14 As a result, it is 
more difficult to utilize this regulatory design rationale to justi-
fy non-Article III adjudication of these claims. Moreover, the 
Court had long identified state and common law claims as the 
most fundamental claims at the heart of the irremovable juris-
diction of the Article III courts,15 making the burden in this ar-
ea a heightened one.16 Another basis would need to be utilized if 
these claims were to be heard in non-Article III federal tribu-
nals. As to these claims, the Court relied on private consent.17 If 
the private parties expressly or impliedly consented to the non-
Article III tribunal’s jurisdiction, then the tribunal could hear 
not only federally-created claims but also any “intertwined” 
state or common law claim.18 Under this doctrine, Congress 
may now authorize the removal of any claim—regulatory, state, 
or common law—from the Article III courts.19 In short, no claim 
is irrevocably guaranteed the protections of Article III. 
With the sanction of the modern doctrine, Congress has 
turned to non-Article III tribunals to resolve an increasingly 
broad swath of claims. Today, tribunals do not merely process 
small-value entitlements like Social Security checks or taxes, 
but instead are Congress’s preferred mechanism for addressing 
 
 12.  Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 587 (noting that under the old test “the 
constitutionality of many quasi-adjudicative activities carried on by adminis-
trative agencies . . . would be thrown into doubt”). 
 13.  Schor, 478 U.S. at 856–57; see Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 592. 
 14. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 284 (1855). 
 15.  See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 449–50 (1977); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51 
(1932); Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450 (1929); Murray’s Lessee, 59 
U.S. (18 How.) at 284. 
 16.  See Schor, 478 U.S. at 850–51, 856–57.  
 17.  Id. at 848–49; Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608 (2011). 
 18.  Schor, 478 U.S. at 843–44; see also infra Part II. 
 19.  Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608, 2613–14; Schor, 478 U.S. at 844 (“[T]o re-
quire a bifurcated examination of the single dispute ‘would be to emasculate if 
not destroy the purposes of the [Act] to provide an efficient and relatively in-
expensive forum for the resolution of disputes in futures trading.’”). 
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some of our nation’s greatest challenges and crises.20 This invo-
cation of customized dispute resolution processes comports with 
the widely held scholarly view that customization provides su-
perior remedies in a more timely and efficient manner than the 
default rules of civil litigation.21 Even more importantly, like 
private ADR mechanisms, publicly created dispute resolution 
systems can achieve goals transcending the mere adjudication 
of rights. For example, creation of the September 11 Fund pro-
vided a national expression of empathy, unity, and patriotism.22 
The concurrent modification of rights and remedies insulated 
likely defendants from liability risks that Congress ostensibly 
deemed incompatible with the public interest.23 Moreover, be-
cause consent is typically a feature of these systems, they hold 
not only the promise of increased legitimacy but must also ap-
pear superior ex ante to traditional litigation to every partici-
pating plaintiff and defendant.24  
 
 20. See, e.g., Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act, Pub. 
L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 
note (2012)). For similar programs, see Smallpox Emergency Personnel Pro-
tection Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-20, 117 Stat. 638 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 239–39h (2012)); Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-
426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2210 note 
(2012)); Public Safety Officers’ Death Benefits Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-430, 
90 Stat. 1346 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 3796 (2012)); Civil Liberties 
Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, 102 Stat. 903 (codified as amended at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2012)) (providing restitution for Japanese-Americans in-
terned during WWII); Countermeasures Injury Compensation Program, 42 
C.F.R. § 110 (2013); see also infra Part II. 
 21. See, e.g., Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 
VA. L. REV. 723, 744–46 (2011); Gary Lawson, Stipulating the Law, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 1191, 1203–04 (2011); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: 
Private Ordering of Public Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514, 516–17 (2009); 
Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract De-
sign, 115 YALE L.J. 814, 856 (2006). 
 22. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Robert L. Rabin, September 11 
Through the Prism of Victim Compensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 485–86 
(2006). 
 23. See Robert L. Rabin, September 11 Through the Prism of Victim Com-
pensation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 464, 464–65 (2006) (reviewing KENNETH R. 
FEINBERG, WHAT IS LIFE WORTH?: THE UNPRECEDENTED EFFORT TO COM-
PENSATE THE VICTIMS OF 9/11 (2005)) (noting that Congress was predominant-
ly concerned with protecting airlines from liability). 
 24. See generally Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio & Adam S. Zimmerman, The 
Agency Class Action, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 2032–33 (2012) (describing 
questions and test cases about fairness of compensation and procedure raised 
prior to claimants’ agreement to participate in the September 11 and BP oil 
spill funds). 
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But to describe these benefits is not to draw any conclusion 
about their coherence with the constitutional limits imposed 
upon Congress’s creation of these non-Article III tribunals.25 
The rise of these new tribunal structures raises pressing ques-
tions about the content of constitutional limitations imposed by 
Article III. Indeed, at times Congress has stated that it under-
took the creation of a non-Article III tribunal not to further a 
regulatory aim, but for the express purpose of avoiding disfa-
vored outcomes in the Article III courts.26 Troublingly, the ap-
plication of the existing doctrine to these new tribunals sug-
gests that these criteria not only do not attain the intended 
objectives but also affirmatively incentivize the precise exer-
tions of congressional power that Article III’s drafters sought to 
preclude.  
Against this backdrop, the modern doctrine has been heav-
ily criticized as irreconcilable with the text of the Constitution 
for chipping away at the separation of powers and checks and 
balances of the Constitution, undermining the ability of the 
constitutional courts to check the political branches.27 The 
 
 25.   Like the Supreme Court opinions described above, this Article utilizes 
the term “non-Article III tribunal” capaciously to refer to all non-Article III 
adjudicative tribunals, including both agency adjudication and legislative 
courts. In addition, this Article incorporates the Court’s contrasting discussion 
of non-Article III personnel within the Article III system—most notably spe-
cial masters and magistrate judges—acting as adjuncts to the Article III judg-
es.  
 26. See KENNETH R. FEINBERG, WHO GETS WHAT: FAIR COMPENSATION 
AFTER TRAGEDY AND FINANCIAL UPHEAVAL 41–42 (2012); see also infra Parts 
II, III. 
 27. Many have remarked that almost every federal courts scholar has 
tackled the constitutionality and limits of legislative courts and non-Article III 
adjudication; for a mere sampling of approaches, see, for example, Akhil Reed 
Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1499, 1500–01 (1990); Paul M. Bator, The Constitution As Architecture: 
Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 234–
35 (1990); Jesse Choper & John Yoo, Wartime Process: A Dialogue on Congres-
sional Power To Remove Issues from the Federal Courts, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 
1243, 1246–47 (2007); David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review 
of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 54–55 (1975); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Adminis-
trative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 917–18 (1988); Gary 
Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 
1231, 1246–48 (1994); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, 
and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. 939, 944–46 (2011); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact 
Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 234 (1985); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the 
Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 563–65 (2007); James E. Pfander, 
Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United 
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Court has itself recognized that the existing doctrine is replete 
with “frequently arcane distinctions and confusing prece-
dents,”28 which “do not admit of easy synthesis,”29 and thus 
“fails to provide concrete guidance” as to the legality of certain 
tribunal schemes.30 Yet, despite granting certiorari on numer-
ous Article III cases in recent terms,31 the Court has been una-
ble to articulate a revised balancing test that resolves these 
concerns with the modern doctrine without undermining the 
Court’s stated desire to promote legislative innovation and liti-
gant autonomy. 
But what if the twin ideals of innovation and autonomy 
that justified the encroachment upon Article III and the bur-
dens of an unpredictable doctrine were entirely misplaced? 
This Article makes precisely that claim: both the modern 
doctrine and its substantial body of scholarly literature are 
based on fundamental misperceptions about the institutional 
design of the Article III courts. The “unique” procedural inno-
vation possible in non-Article III tribunals is not only also pos-
sible in Article III courts, but already in common use.32 Moreo-
 
States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 648 (2004); Martin H. Redish, Legislative 
Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 
DUKE L.J. 197, 201 (1983); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring 
Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 
B.U. L. REV. 85, 87–88 (1988). 
 28. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 583 (1985) 
(quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (plurality opinion)). 
 29. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 847 
(1986). 
 30. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011); accord Schor, 478 U.S. 
at 847.  
 31.  See, e.g., Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l U.S.A., 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1146 (2013) 
(addressing the cases and controversies requirement and standing); Elgin v. 
Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2140 (2012) (holding that a statutory re-
view regime precluded Article III district court jurisdiction); Stern, 131 S. Ct. 
at 2620 (holding that bankruptcy court review of a state law counterclaim in a 
bankruptcy case violated Article III); United States v. Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 
917 (2009) (finding that Article I military appellate courts have jurisdiction to 
hear claims for post-conviction relief); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 795, 
798 (2008) (holding that military tribunals did not provide an adequate substi-
tute for the writ of habeas corpus); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 
U.S. 118, 120–21 (2007) (analyzing limitations upon Article III review of exec-
utive branch’s patent decisions); Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 
200, 202 (1994) (addressing whether a statutory review scheme precludes a 
district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a pre-
enforcement challenge to the statute). 
 32.  See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 (stating that courts have broad jurisdic-
tion and are experts in common law); cf. Lawson, supra note 21, at 1203–04, 
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ver, far from acting as a bulwark of autonomy,33 the use of con-
sent as a basis for non-Article III adjudication has repeatedly 
resulted in Congress utilizing its power as systems designer to 
coercively obtain consent to modifications that would otherwise 
be unconstitutional.34 This Article sets forth a case that the 
foundational assumptions on which the two pillars of current 
doctrine are built—the unique power of innovation outside Ar-
ticle III and consent—are not merely under-theorized, but in-
stead are simply wrong. This claim rests not only upon the as-
sumptions’ contravention of modern procedural theory but also 
on existing and incontrovertible structural features of our judi-
cial system.  
Recognizing that the judicial system has the capacity to 
meet every one of the needs identified as justifying non-Article 
III tribunals raises substantial questions about the validity of 
the existing doctrine’s accommodation toward those tribunals. 
But it does not mean that we must prohibit non-Article III tri-
bunals entirely nor that they have no unique value. Instead, it 
raises a set of second-generation questions that are far deeper 
and more complex than those currently addressed by the courts 
or scholars in assessing the rationale for, and resulting limits 
upon, the use of these tribunal structures.  
Part I provides an overview of the origins of the problem 
posed by Article III through the lens of the Supreme Court’s 
evolving doctrine. This discussion explores the Court’s rejection 
of the formalism of the early doctrine’s categorical test based 
upon an increased appreciation of the interaction of substance 
and procedure.  
Part II argues that the Court’s stated rationale of further-
ing procedural innovation cannot stand; indeed, every type of 
innovation identified by the Court is already available within 
the Article III courts. This Part then analyzes the doctrinal 
test’s outcomes, revealing that it is not consistent with the 
 
1210 (describing how parties have some control in Article III courts through 
the use of stipulations). 
 33.  See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 855 (noting that separation of powers 
concerns are diminished where the non-Article III tribunal is selected with 
party consent). 
 34.  See Rabin, supra note 23, at 464–65 (noting that Congress was pre-
dominantly concerned with protecting airlines from liability). See generally 
Sant’Ambrogio & Zimmerman, supra note 24, at 1995, 2032–33 (describing 
how agencies often lack the ability to create aggregate claims and thus exper-
iment with informal aggregation, which raises questions about transparency 
and fairness of compensation and procedure). 
DODGE_5fmt 1/25/2015 1:04 PM 
912 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:905 
 
goals identified by the Court. This Part concludes by identify-
ing the normative goals the existing doctrine is actually fur-
thering and then exploring the extent to which these goals are 
consistent with the Court’s interpretation of the structural role 
of Article III. 
Part III then turns to the individual protections of Article 
III. The Court and commentators have consistently assumed 
that allowing individuals to waive their Article III rights fur-
thers autonomy interests, while posing no threat to the struc-
tural role of the constitutional courts.35 This Part argues that 
these assumptions overlook the power of pairing substantive 
and procedural terms, such that individuals that refuse to con-
sent to a waiver of their Article III rights are subjected to di-
minished substantive rights or procedural barriers, in an at-
tempt to coerce consent to non-Article III tribunal 
determinations that would otherwise be unconstitutional. This 
Part demonstrates that, far from being hypothetical, these pro-
visions are already included in a number of enabling statutes 
that create non-Article III tribunals.  
I. THE PROBLEM OF ARTICLE III DOCTRINE IN A WORLD 
OF NON-ARTICLE III ADJUDICATION  
Why can we not simply enforce Article III as written? The 
language seems clear36: “The judicial Power of the United 
States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferi-
or Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and es-
tablish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, 
shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at 
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which 
shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”37  
The simple answer is that from the earliest days of our na-
tion, Congress has created tribunals that decide disputes but 
which lack the mandated salary and tenure protections.38 The 
courts readily accepted these early tribunals,39 whether as a re-
flection of early constitutional understandings or mere pragma-
 
 35.  See Schor, 478 U.S. at 843–44; Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608. 
 36. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 27, at 916 (“By nearly universal consen-
sus, the most plausible construction of this language would hold that if Con-
gress creates any adjudicative bodies . . . it must grant them the protections of 
judicial independence that are contemplated by [A]rticle III.”). 
 37. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (emphasis added). 
 38. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 222–23 (5th ed. 2007). 
 39.  See, e.g., Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 522 (1828). 
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tism—or, more likely, a degree of both. Thus, for two centuries, 
the challenge of Article III has been to articulate a test for un-
derstanding in which circumstances these tribunals are con-
sistent with the Constitution. Of course, with the passage of 
time, both the roles of the judiciary and the other branches 
have developed in ways that arguably depart from the vision of 
the Founders, adding further complexity.40 Each line of scholar-
ship and interpretation has added richness to the debate, yet 
none have proven able to obtain the decisive endorsement of 
the Supreme Court.41  
This Part provides a brief roadmap of the shifting Article 
III doctrine. Section A focuses upon the initial, categorical ap-
proach to analyzing the use of non-Article III tribunals. Section 
B explores the motivations for the transition to a balancing ap-
proach and the criticism this approach has engendered from 
scholars and the Court alike. Underlying this historical discus-
sion, the Part focuses upon identifying the assumptions about 
the nature of the judicial form and institutional structure that 
led to the development of the doctrine, as a foundation for the 
analysis that follows in Part II and III of the fit between these 
normative aims and the resulting doctrine. 
A. THE CATEGORICAL, PUBLIC-PRIVATE RIGHTS APPROACH 
As early as the first session of the First Congress, non-
Article III tribunals and officers were granted the authority to 
decide a number of issues and disputes that were seemingly 
within the ambit of the judicial power.42 One set of these early 
claims involved the administrative determination of amounts 
due to or from the government; for example, customs duties43 
and veterans benefits.44 But other disputes involved matters 
that appeared much more judicial in nature, as with the au-
 
 40.  See, e.g., infra Part II.E (describing Congress’s expanded role in the 
modern administrative state). 
 41. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 
583 (1985) (“An absolute construction of Article III is not possible in this area 
of ‘frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents.’” (quoting N. Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, 
J., concurring) (plurality opinion))). 
 42. Fallon, supra note 27, at 919–20. 
 43. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, I Stat. 29; Act of Sept. 1, 1789, ch. 11, I 
Stat. 55. 
 44. See Act of Sept. 29, 1789, ch. 24, I Stat. 95. 
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thorization for military courts martial45 and territorial courts,46 
neither of which utilized Article III judges although they indis-
putably functioned as courts. 
In Murray’s Lessee, the constitutionality of these non-
Article III structures came before the Court in the form of a 
challenge to the Treasury Department’s determination of a de-
ficiency owed by a customs collector and resulting property 
sale.47 Explaining the constitutionality of the non-Article III de-
termination, the Court articulated the “public rights” doctrine.48 
This approach identified three categories of disputes, which 
each received different constitutional protections. First, there 
are those disputes that are not susceptible to Article III deter-
mination, and thus Congress cannot subject them to Article III 
judicial determination. Second, there are those disputes that 
are wholly within the judicial power, and which Congress can-
not withdraw from the Article III courts. These disputes were 
defined as “any matter which, from its nature, is the subject of 
a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty.”49 Third, 
there exists a category of disputes that could be subject to judi-
cial determination but which are equally susceptible to legisla-
tive or executive determination.50 As to this final category of 
claims, denominated as matters involving “public rights,” Con-
gress “may or may not bring within the cognizance of the courts 
of the United States, as it may deem proper.”51 
Over time, the public rights exception was further clarified 
(or, some would say, expanded) to include any matter “between 
the Government and persons subject to its authority in connec-
tion with the performance of the constitutional functions of the 
executive or legislative departments.”52 In contrast, matters of 
“private right, that is, of the liability of one individual to anoth-
er,” remained exclusively within the judicial power.53 By 1932, 
Congress had delegated its power to executive officers for non-
Article III determination of a variety of matters related “to in-
 
 45. See David M. Schlueter, The Court-Martial: An Historical Survey, 87 
MIL. L. REV. 129, 150 (1980). 
 46. See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828). 
 47. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 274–76 (1855). 
 48. Id. at 284. 
 49. Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932). 
 53. Id. at 51.  
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terstate and foreign commerce, taxation, immigration, the pub-
lic lands, public health, . . . pensions,” and benefits payments, 
among others.54 Yet, as Congress relied upon non-Article III ad-
judicators in an increasingly broad swath of claims, it began to 
test the boundaries of the categorical approach by transferring 
cases involving disputes between private parties to agency ad-
judicators. How would the Court respond to these new regimes?  
B. THE MODERN BALANCING APPROACH 
After more than a century of use, the Court abandoned the 
categorical, public-private rights approach in favor of the bal-
ancing test, holding that substance must predominate over 
formal categorization.55 The doctrinal shift to the balancing test 
expressly recognized the role of Congress as systems designer 
as part and parcel of Congress’s Article I powers to enact public 
regulatory schemes.56 In making this shift, the Court expressly 
articulated its fear that continued perpetration of a categorical 
test would “erect a rigid and formalistic restraint on the ability 
of Congress to adopt innovative measures such as negotiation 
and arbitration with respect to rights created by a regulatory 
scheme.”57 It was thus a fear of encroaching upon Congress’s 
role as systems designer, in an era of burgeoning use of ADR 
that led to the adoption of the current balancing test.  
In Stern v. Marshall, Chief Justice Roberts clarified the 
new doctrine that Justice O’Connor had announced in Thomas 
v. Union Carbide by explaining “what makes a right ‘public’ ra-
ther than private is that the right is integrally related to par-
ticular federal government action.”58 With this restatement, 
cases “in which the claim at issue derives from a federal regula-
tory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert 
government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory 
objective within the agency’s authority” are public rights cases, 
which may be adjudicated before a non-Article III tribunal at 
Congress’s election.59 Initially this power was applied to cases 
in which “[a]ny right to compensation . . . results from [federal 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587 (1985). 
 56.  Id. at 593–94. 
 57. Id. at 594. 
 58. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2598 (2011); accord United States 
v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 131. S. Ct. 2313, 2323 (2011); Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 844, 856 (1986). 
 59. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613. 
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statute] . . . and does not depend upon or replace a right to such 
compensation under state law.”60 But just a year later, the Su-
preme Court clarified that state and common law claims that 
were intertwined with the statutory claim could be properly ad-
judicated by a non-Article III tribunal with the consent of the 
parties, in order to prevent frustrating Congress’s legislative 
aims.61  
It may therefore be unsurprising that, as Justice Scalia 
noted in his recent concurrence in Stern v. Marshall, in less 
than three decades of use, the balancing test has been variously 
comprised of over a half-dozen different factors—suggesting the 
unworkability of the test.62 The majority opinion in Stern simi-
larly conceded the necessity of clarifying the doctrine, as the 
balancing test “fails to provide concrete guidance” to parties 
about the ambit of public and private rights, and in turn the 
constitutionality of particular non-Article III adjudications.63 
Scholars have likewise described the Court’s Article III doctrine 
as “troubled, arcane, confused and [as] confusing as could be 
imagined.”64 
Despite narrowly deciding the issue and reserving clarifi-
cation of the doctrine for another day, the Roberts Court hinted 
at its view of the doctrine. The majority suggested a concern 
with ending the slippery slope of the past in which the permis-
sible scope of non-Article III adjudication broadened, seemingly 
as a pragmatic response to the realities of the administrative 
state rather than a principled consideration of the Constitu-
tion’s requirements and law.65 In closing, Chief Justice Roberts 
provided a warning: 
A statute may no more lawfully chip away at the authority of the Ju-
dicial Branch than it may eliminate it entirely. ‘Slight encroachments 
create new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new ter-
ritory to capture.’ Although ‘[i]t may be that it is the obnoxious thing 
in its mildest and least repulsive form,’ we cannot overlook the intru-
sion: ‘illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing 
in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from 
legal modes of procedure.’
66 
 
 60. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 584. 
 61. Schor, 478 U.S. at 856. 
 62. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 2615 (majority opinion). 
 64. Bator, supra note 27, at 239. 
 65. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614, 2620. 
 66. Id. at 2620 (citations omitted).  
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While the Roberts Court has shown its willingness to re-
think the doctrine,67 any revision may lead simply to another 
round of doctrinal critique and revision if we do not have an ac-
curate understanding of the magnitude of the problem. Indeed, 
the Court has already been called upon to clarify how the 
courts are to respond to the limits upon non-Article III adjudi-
cation articulated in Stern.68 Myriad constitutional critiques 
have been offered by the Court and constitutional scholars, 
which this Article does not seek to recapitulate. Instead, this 
Article turns to the more fundamental question of whether the 
pragmatic justifications identified by the Court for upholding 
non-Article III tribunals can bear the weight the current doc-
trine places upon them. 
II. THE STRUCTURAL ROLES OF ARTICLE III  
As detailed in Part I, the Supreme Court abandoned the 
categorical test out of a pragmatic concern with allowing inno-
vation in dispute resolution, in the form of both ADR and spe-
cialized tribunals. Yet, as detailed in Section A, the Article III 
courts already have the capacity to incorporate all of these pur-
portedly unique features of tribunals. This capacity is not mere-
ly theoretical, but already in place throughout the Article III 
judiciary. The value of non-Article III adjudication should then 
not rest upon the fallacy of innovation. Moreover, as explored in 
Section B, the emerging reliance upon non-Article III tribunals 
risks not only disturbing the balance of powers but also under-
mining the fulfillment of those powers.  
This is not to say that there is no value in non-Article III 
adjudication. Rather, the value of tribunals has simply been 
miscategorized over time. Section C explores the unique values 
provided by the non-Article III courts within our constitutional 
system, given the definitional roles of the competing branches. 
Section D then identifies the consequences that the error in de-
fining the role of non-Article III tribunals has had for the nar-
rowness test69 and intertwining doctrine.70 Finally, Section E 
concludes by demonstrating that the approach suggested by 
modern procedure and ADR comports precisely with the initial 
 
 67.  See, e.g., id. at 2594 (recognizing that the jurisprudence of the public 
rights doctrine lacks clarity, but finding that the present case is so distinct 
that no opinion on the doctrine’s application in other contexts is required). 
 68.  See Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165 (2014).  
 69.  See supra text accompanying note 60. 
 70.  See supra text accompanying note 61. 
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articulation of the doctrine in the earliest Article III cases—
suggesting the robustness of the approach, even as the roles of 
government have developed over time. 
A. DISPELLING THE MYTH OF UNIQUE, NON-ARTICLE III 
INNOVATION 
The Supreme Court’s expansion of agency adjudication ex-
pressly derived from an understanding that agencies had supe-
rior factual expertise relating to particular disputes and were 
granted deference with respect to their legal interpretations of 
the implementing statute.71 As the Court recognized, district 
court judges are generalists, whereas agencies are specialized 
bodies.72 It therefore followed that the agency had greater ex-
pertise with respect to the particular subject matter.73  
Under this current doctrine, the same test is applied to 
both non-agency legislative courts, which exist solely or primar-
ily for the purpose of adjudication, and agencies.74 Yet, many 
have noted that the Court has routinely approved of agency ad-
judication, while frequently striking down legislative courts.75 
The amorphous notion shared by the doctrine and commenta-
tors is that legislative courts are somehow more troubling than 
agency adjudication.76 This intuition, captured in commentary 
 
 71.  See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 49–50 (1932) (stating that 
Congress may employ an administrative system to resolve maritime issues, 
but the Article III courts must retain the power to deny administrative find-
ings that are contrary to the evidence). 
 72.  See id. at 51–52 (explaining that Congress has authority to create 
non-Article III tribunals that serve as special tribunals over particular mat-
ters). 
 73. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852, 856 
(1986). 
 74. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611–15 (2011) (recount-
ing the application of the public rights doctrine to cases involving the Treasury 
Department, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, and bankruptcy 
courts); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 222–25 (explaining that both non-
agency legislative courts and agencies have been permitted to hear disputes 
involving United States possessions and territories, military issues, civil dis-
putes between private citizens and the United States, and criminal matters or 
disputes among citizens where the non-Article III court serves as an adjunct to 
an Article III court). 
 75. See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Sepa-
ration of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 622 (1984) 
(asserting that a decision-maker in an agency is perceived as better insulated 
from political pressures and organizational responsibilities than a decision-
maker in a legislative court). 
 76. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 27, at 923–29 (discussing the tensions and 
similarities between agency adjudication and legislative courts with respect to 
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and case outcomes—yet not directly reflected in the existing 
Article III test—suggests a need to revisit the doctrine and its 
underlying assumptions. If one can identify the source of this 
intuition, then it may be possible to develop an alternative test 
more consistent with these underlying ideals and understand-
ings.  
This Section argues that the Supreme Court either identi-
fied the wrong point of comparison or that its thinking about 
judicial procedure prematurely ossified. The question should 
not have been whether the agency offered benefits relative to 
the district court.77 Rather, the question should have been 
whether non-judicial adjudication offered benefits relative to 
judicial proceedings. This distinction is not merely semantic. 
By expanding the point of comparison from a generalist district 
court judge to the full panoply of judicial options—from magis-
trate judges and special masters, to multi-district litigations 
(MDLs) and specialized courts—the “benefit” of non-judicial 
tribunals is greatly reduced.  
In its doctrine, the Supreme Court has frequently identi-
fied factual expertise as a key benefit of agency adjudication.78 
But Congress has the ability to obtain the same specialization 
through Article III courts as it can through Article I adjudica-
tion. First, it may generate specialization within the Article III 
system through the use of jurisdictional provisions, as occurs 
with certain federal claims, patent law, tax law, and adminis-
trative law issues.79 Second, as the Court has recognized,80 the 
court may appoint a special master or magistrate within Article 
 
pragmatic function and encroachment upon Article III).  
 77. But see Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50–65 (comparing the procedures used by 
the deputy commissioner and those used by the district courts). 
 78. See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 855–56 (noting that the Supreme Court 
has identified agency adjudication as expeditious, inexpensive, and expert). 
 79. See Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative 
Lawmaking System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1111–15 (1990) (analyzing both 
full-time specialized courts in the Federal Circuit and the Court of Interna-
tional Trade and part-time Article III courts including the Temporary Emer-
gency Court of Appeals, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and the 
Court of Veterans); cf. In re September 11 Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 
(S.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding statutory provision granting exclusive jurisdiction 
for claims for damages arising out of September 11 terrorist attacks to the 
Southern District of New York). 
 80. See, e.g., Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51 (describing the frequent historical 
practice of utilizing factual experts, special masters, and commissioners to aid 
the Article III courts). 
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III to attain the same factual specialization.81 Third, Congress 
can expressly authorize the utilization of special masters, 
where temporary factual specialization is desired and where it 
believes that the ex post selection of a special master by the 
court, in light of the particular nature of the dispute at issue, 
will provide a benefit.82 Fourth, Congress may create hybrid 
courts that operate as adjuncts to the Article III courts. This 
type of arrangement is exemplified by the post-Stern bankrupt-
cy courts: they serve as Article I courts as to rights arising un-
der the Bankruptcy Code, but as adjuncts acting upon a refer-
ral from the district court as to determinations of state and 
common law.83 Fifth, Congress can create structures that allow 
for the selection of particular Article III judges to develop fac-
tual specialization in a particular case or legal specialization in 
a particular type of case. Multi-district litigation exemplifies 
this type of procedural innovation. Rather than randomly as-
signing cases, the MDL Panel specifically selects the best-
qualified Article III judge based upon expertise in complex liti-
gation and/or the particular factual or substantive law issues 
raised by the litigation. All of the cases raising that issue are 
then referred to that single judge for consolidated pre-trial case 
management and motion practice—a procedural consolidation 
known as MDL.84  
 
 81. See Revesz, supra note 79, at 1119–20 (explaining that specialized Ar-
ticle III courts may be an effective method for resolving routine, high-volume 
cases); Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad 
Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2132–33 (1989) (discussing factual 
and procedural expertise these adjuncts can bring to bear upon a case, with a 
focus upon special masters). 
 82. See D. Theodore Rave, Politicians As Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
671, 684 n.60 (2013) (noting that court-appointed special masters created far 
more neutral processes than political officials, in the context of voter districts 
and gerrymandering, and arguing this had beneficial effects with respect to 
legitimacy); cf. Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1179, 1283 n.250 (2013) (noting that courts have the authority to appoint spe-
cial masters under the Federal Rules); Brian Walker, Lessons That Wrongful 
Death Tort Law Can Learn from the September 11th Victim Compensation 
Fund, 28 REV. LITIG. 595, 602–03 (2009) (discussing how Feinberg’s selection 
as Special Master influenced the Fund).  
 83. This approach has been adopted by a number of courts post-Stern. For 
commentary by practitioners on the impact, see Update: Defanging Stern v. 
Marshall: The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York Modifies the Reference of Bankruptcy Matters To Address Issues Result-
ing from the Supreme Court’s Ruling, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Mar. 2012), 
http://d4qxztsgsn706.cloudfront.net/images/content/1/1/v2/1100.pdf. 
 84. See Robin J. Effron, The Shadow Rules of Joinder, 100 GEO. L.J. 759, 
761 (2012); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, 
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As these examples illustrate, Article III structures can be 
customized along a number of dimensions, depending upon the 
particular substantive needs or preferences of Congress. First, 
they may be long-term appointments, as with bankruptcy judg-
es and magistrate judges, or ad hoc, case-specific appointments 
as with special masters and MDL. Second, they may be ap-
pointed in advance of the dispute or may be selected post-
dispute. Although this pre-/post-dispute dimension is often cor-
related with whether there is a desire for a standing body or in-
stead a tailored selection of the adjudicator, there is no reason 
these two dimensions must be paired. Indeed, there are cur-
rently systems in which panels of potential neutrals are main-
tained in which case-specific selection is made simply on a ro-
tating basis, as well as systems in which selection is made 
based upon relative qualification. Third, selection can focus up-
on factual or legal expertise, or even upon procedural or dispute 
resolution expertise. Fourth, one could also consider the mech-
anism for selection of the neutral. The Supreme Court has said 
it does not matter for constitutional purposes whether a non-
Article III adjudicator is selected by the Article III courts.85 If 
this is true, then we might envision not only systems in which 
the adjudicator is selected by the presiding district court judge, 
the Article III judiciary, or even with the participation of the 
parties, but also the potential for selection by the executive or 
legislative branches. These are, of course, not the only four di-
mensions along which institutional design and resulting nor-
mative preferences may operate, but they are instructive in il-
luminating the extent to which systems design allows Congress 
to tailor the Article III processes to meet its substantive objec-
tives. 
Given the breadth of this mere sampling of structural and 
procedural innovations, it is difficult to envision any Article I 
fact-specialization structure that could not be incorporated into 
the Article III system. Indeed, last term in Arkison, the Su-
preme Court expressly upheld the ability of non-Article III ad-
judicators to make preliminary determinations of both law and 
fact as entirely consistent with Article III, where those deter-
 
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 
88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 292–93 (2013). 
 85. For example, the Supreme Court has allowed non-Article III adjudica-
tion by magistrate judges selected by Article III judges, United States v. 
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681–84 (1980), as well as adjudication by courts mar-
tial, where the adjudicators are not selected by Article III judges, Dynes v. 
Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 74 (1857). 
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minations were reviewed de novo by the Article III court.86 
Congress is not only the body responsible for the creation of the 
non-Article III tribunals but is also entrusted with the creation 
and operation of the Article III courts.87 As a result, the same 
design principles that Congress applies to yield any superior 
results could frequently be incorporated within the Article III 
system—a point entirely overlooked in the existing doctrine.  
The availability of innovation within Article III raises fun-
damental second-generation questions about whether the Con-
stitution prefers non-Article III adjudicators situated in Article 
III over those situated in Article I or II. Yet these questions 
have not been considered in either the theory or doctrine be-
cause of the (erroneous) assumed unique capacities of non-
Article III adjudicators. Having removed these “unique” capaci-
ties from the equation, a far more difficult constitutional ques-
tion is presented. No longer can accommodation rest upon the 
pragmatic necessity of procedural innovation in adjudication. 
But before turning to this normative question, one must al-
so ask two threshold questions. First, what are the structural 
costs of permitting Congress broad powers to elect to utilize 
non-Article III tribunals? Second, when do non-Article III adju-
dicators potentially fulfill a role that may not be replicated by 
an Article III court. The next Sections turn to these threshold 
cost-benefit questions in turn. 
B. THE STRUCTURAL COSTS OF NON-ARTICLE III TRIBUNALS 
The Constitution guarantees the protections of Article III 
as a bulwark for the individual and the balance of powers alike. 
Building upon this constitutional foundation, scholars have 
long articulated the normative basis for this guarantee. This 
Section does not seek to recapitulate the familiar doctrine and 
existing scholarship surrounding the necessity of Article III in 
the balance of powers. Rather, this Section seeks to supplement 
these arguments, asking whether there are any additional dan-
gers that are emerging from the perspective of modern proce-
dure and legislation. 
It has traditionally been assumed that Congress creates 
non-Article III tribunals to pair adjudication with an executive 
 
 86. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2175 (2014). 
 87. See, e.g., Livingston v. Story, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 632, 656 (1835) (“[Con-
gress’s] power to ordain and establish, carries with it the power to prescribe 
and regulate the modes of proceeding in such courts, admits of as little 
doubt.”). 
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or legislative function, resulting in superior outcomes.88 But in 
recent years, Congress has created tribunals for the inverse 
reason: dissatisfaction with the cost and delay of the Article III 
court system. To the extent that Congress can side-step prob-
lems in the Article III system by using non-Article III courts, it 
decreases the systemic pressure toward reform, as the handful 
of incidents most likely to drive political pressure toward re-
form are treated instead through one-off legislative solutions.  
The September 11 Fund is a prominent example of this 
phenomenon, as congressional intervention was driven not by a 
desire to assist victims but instead, an expressly stated desire 
to insulate the airline industry from anticipated expensive, pro-
tracted, non-meritorious litigation.89 The concern for Congress 
was not the substantive worry that the airlines would be found 
guilty but, instead that the due process available in the consti-
tutional courts would itself be too delayed and expensive, harm-
ing defendants’ bottom lines.90 
The capacity of Congress to remedy systemic problems 
within the Article III courts through the ad hoc removal of cas-
es from the constitutional courts to tribunals—rather than 
through improved funding, or jurisdictional or procedural pro-
visions aimed at correcting structural problems in the Article 
III courts—may pose a risk of impairing the development of the 
judiciary. Thus, allowing innovation to occur through non-
Article III courts risks undermining Congress’s faithful execu-
tion of its constitutionally designated role as the designer of the 
Article III courts.  
C. RECONCEPTUALIZING THE INSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF NON-
ARTICLE III ADJUDICATION 
Although the benefits of innovation and specialization are 
not as unique as presupposed, this does not preclude non-
Article III adjudication from having other unique value relative 
to Article III adjudication. Returning to first principles, one 
might ask what essential characteristics distinguish Article III 
courts from other tribunals. Viewed through this lens, the dis-
 
 88.  See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
855–56 (1986) (explaining that Congress granted an agency jurisdiction over 
common law counterclaims only to ensure that the agency was able to effi-
ciently resolve all matters within its area of expertise). 
 89.  See FEINBERG, supra note 26, at 41–43 (describing Congress’s efforts 
to limit lawsuits against airlines following the September 11 terrorist attacks). 
 90.  See id. at 41–42. 
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tinct value of the constitutional courts stems from these 
unique, core traits: judicial processes are characterized by an 
independent judiciary, insulated by the structural protections 
of Article III, exercising decision-making authority over a case 
or controversy, consistent with the procedural protections 
granted by the Constitution, statutes, and the Federal Rules.  
The first threshold area of non-Article III superiority thus 
stems from the requirements of Article III itself: the cases and 
controversies requirement.91 Some disputes are inherently not 
suitable for reframing as a judicial lawsuit, or reframing may 
diminish the value of the adjudication. Advisory opinions are a 
common example of this dynamic, in which Congress or the 
President desires the courts’ opinion but is unwilling to agree 
to be bound by the decision. Likewise, the constitutional re-
quirement of standing, and the prudential doctrines of ripeness 
and mootness, may result in the Article III courts declining to 
hear a case. Thus, the modern interpretation of Article III cre-
ates a set of requirements which themselves may impede judi-
cial intervention to such an extent that a non-Article III pro-
cess is not just preferable, but the only constitutional option 
available to Congress.92 
But there are also adjudicative matters as to which the 
non-Article III adjudicators fulfill a different role than Article 
III judges. Making this observation is not itself a normative 
judgment about which of the two types of adjudicator is superi-
or—rather, it is to say that before we can decide which arbiter 
is normatively better, we must first know in which domains dif-
ferences exist. 
First, to the extent that a claim involves a highly rou-
tinized payment of government funds, even the most minimal 
level of process available within our judicial system may be 
more than Congress prefers. From this perspective, it is not 
that Article III shirks its duties to hear “mundane,” as well as 
 
 91. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 92.  
The [Article III] issue has historically been posed as if Congress was a 
predator, taking jurisdiction and remedial power away from the Arti-
cle III judiciary. Yet recent doctrinal answers from the Supreme 
Court have rejected statutes in which Congress has been a conveyer, 
giving authority to the federal courts. . . . In other words, the recent 
case law suggests that Article III judges have asserted the structural 
authority of Article III against congressional decisions authorizing 
decisionmaking by life-tenured judges.  
Judith Resnik, The Federal Courts and Congress: Additional Sources, Alterna-
tive Texts, and Altered Aspirations, 86 GEO. L.J. 2589, 2592–93 (1998). 
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glamorous, disputes.93 Rather, it is the recognition that these 
payments are well within the spending power assigned to Con-
gress; indeed, for the first few decades, Congress exerted this 
power itself as to a number of benefits.94  
Congress may elect to retain the power to make these spe-
cific payment determinations or delegate it to the other 
branches. Congress has long delegated the routinized pro-
cessing of these claims to the executive branch.95 In making this 
delegation, Congress’s power to delegate inherently contains 
the lesser power to delegate these powers to the executive, but 
subject them to a greater level of appellate review than would 
otherwise exist.96  
Alternatively, Congress may convert these payments into 
cognizable judicial claims in the first instance—but it is not re-
quired to do so.97 Indeed, from the perspective of Article III, 
there are strong normative reasons not to do so, given that ad-
ministrative calculations have often not included the same level 
of process associated with the constitutional courts. Congress 
could of course create a federal small-claims process within the 
Court of Federal Claims for processing these payments.98 But to 
do so may risk diluting due process, and in turn the legitimacy 
of the Article III courts. Indeed, it was these fears of diluting 
the special role of the Article III courts that generated the 
strong backlash against the proposal to make bankruptcy judg-
es Article III judges.99  
 
 93. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 
n.39 (1982). 
 94. See Fallon, supra note 27, at 919–20. 
 95. See Nelson, supra note 27, at 582–83 (reviewing the origins of non-
Article III adjudication and concluding that early courts relied upon Con-
gress’s power to make or delegate spending decisions, rather than relying up-
on sovereign immunity). 
 96. See Kent Barnett, Codifying Chevmore, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. __, *62–*63 
(forthcoming 2015), most recent draft available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2405016 (“[B]ecause Congress generally has the 
greater power to preclude judicial review of administrative action (at least for 
public-rights cases), it should have the lesser power of establishing the inten-
sity of judicial review that it grants . . . .”). 
 97. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2612 (2011) (noting that Con-
gress has the power to bring public rights into or out of the judicial sphere). 
 98. For such a proposal, see Anthony Ciolli, Lowering the Stakes: Toward 
a Model of Effective Copyright Dispute Resolution, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 999, 
1023–29 (2008). 
 99. See Troy A. McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the 
Bankruptcy Courts, 62 STAN. L. REV. 747, 760–61 (2010) (discussing fears that 
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Second, a class of statutory claims exists whose determina-
tion is not merely of the particular liability at stake, but in-
stead aids an agency in fulfilling its rulemaking function. For 
example, adjudication may be useful to the agency in identify-
ing areas in which clarification is needed or in experimenting 
with the consequences of particular policies. Far more often, 
adjudication becomes a component of informal rulemaking.100 In 
this case, agency adjudication is a mechanism for fulfilling the 
delegation of legislative authority to the agency.  
This suggests a different approach to agency adjudication, 
somewhat distinct from legislative courts. In Congress’s fulfill-
ment of its legislative role and its necessary and proper powers, 
it may directly legislate to create or abolish certain claims, or it 
may delegate this power to an agency tasked with filling the in-
terstices of the statutory framework.101 In contrast, legislative 
courts cannot claim this quasi-legislative rulemaking function. 
The legislative courts’ power is therefore derivative only of the 
doctrinal tenet that congressionally created rights may be as-
signed to a non-Article III tribunal, as they exist at the largesse 
of Congress (or so the doctrine says).102 
To be clear, this observation is not one of constitutional in-
terpretation. Rather, it is an observation of institutional design, 
stemming from asking the question of in what circumstances 
non-Article III tribunals obtain ends that cannot be achieved 
through the constitutional courts. With these threshold obser-
vations about the nature of these competing institutions set 
forth, one can then turn to the normative questions they impli-
cate and, finally, to the assessment of constitutional theory.103  
 
elevating bankruptcy judges would “dilute the significance, and prestige, of 
district judgeships”). 
 100. For an excellent summary of adjudicative rulemaking and its interac-
tion with informal rulemaking, see Russell L. Weaver, Chenery II: A Forty-
Year Retrospective, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 161, 166–70 (1988), and, more recently, 
Alan B. Morrison, Administrative Agencies Are Just Like Legislatures and 
Courts—Except When They’re Not, 59 ADMIN L. REV. 79, 98–118 (2007). 
 101. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (de-
scribing the non-delegation doctrine).  
 102. Many scholars have argued that agency adjudication avoids a problem 
of uniformity among the circuits that could promote forum-shopping. But, this 
concern could be remedied by specialized Article III jurisdiction, as has oc-
curred in many areas—and thus is not an argument for agencies over courts, 
but simply specialization over general adjudication. For a summary of this de-
bate, see Currie & Goodman, supra note 27, at 5–75. 
 103. Some scholars have argued that administrative agencies should not be 
permitted to combine rulemaking, adjudicatory, and enforcement functions. 
For discussion of this scholarship, see Revesz, supra note 79, at 1115. 
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Viewed in this manner, there is a second set of fundamen-
tal constitutional and normative questions that have been ex-
cluded entirely from the existing Article III doctrine. The dele-
gation of both rulemaking and adjudicative authority to the 
same agency raises substantial questions of institutional de-
sign. On the one hand, one might argue that this allows a la-
boratory for innovation in which agencies have a far freer hand 
in determining how to elaborate and promulgate policy.104 On 
the other hand, the investiture of executive, legislative, and 
quasi-judicial powers in the same body is contrary to the sepa-
ration of powers ideal of our tri-partite system of government.105 
Yet, because of the doctrine’s current framing, these questions 
have not heretofore been explored fully. 
D. AGAINST THE DOCTRINE’S NARROWNESS LIMITATION 
The existing doctrine now permits the transfer of claims 
between private parties to non-Article III tribunals only where 
that claim is created by federal statute or intertwined with a 
federal statutory right. Some constitutional scholars have ar-
gued that the early categorical approach became marked by 
generalizations rather than clear tests—and thus, that the nar-
rowness test is simply an extension of this underlying error. 
Others have argued that it follows clearly from the Constitu-
tion that Congress should be able to except these cases from the 
Article III courts. 
Recognizing the ongoing debate among federal courts 
scholars about the impact of the current doctrine, this Section 
asks what insights can be drawn from civil procedure. The 
analysis suggests that the existing doctrine is not consistent 
with the normative goals identified by the Court, but instead is 
too broad in certain areas and too narrow, in permitting the use 
of non-Article III adjudicators, in others.  
1. The Assignment of Intertwined Claims to Tribunals 
The Court’s application of a balancing test in assessing the 
constitutionality of non-Article III courts makes the establish-
ment of any clear guidance somewhat tentative, as the Court 
 
 104.  See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 27 (arguing for the appellate review 
model). 
 105.  See, e.g., William T. Mayton, The Legislative Resolution of the Rule-
making Versus Adjudication Problem in Agency Lawmaking, 1980 DUKE L.J. 
103, 104 (1980); Mila Sohoni, Agency Adjudication and Judicial 
Nondelegation: An Article III Canon, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1569, 1574–75 (2013). 
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itself has recognized.106 However, some general principles can 
be drawn from the Court’s past decisions: if Congress authoriz-
es a tribunal to adjudicate disputes related to a particular fed-
eral regulatory framework, courts should uphold this authori-
zation as sufficiently narrow.107 In addition, “intertwined” legal 
claims—typically state or common-law claims whose elements 
are entirely resolved by the necessarily-resolved elements of 
the statutory claim—can also be delegated to this non-Article 
III body.108 Put another way, Congress is no longer limited to 
only removing jurisdiction for public funds and statutory 
claims, but instead can reach essentially all private law claims 
if it does so through the vehicle of an intertwined statutory re-
gime. But, if instead Congress creates non-Article III courts to 
allow a specialist in a particular factual area to decide disputes 
involving a variety of legal claims, this delegation will be struck 
down.109 
This bifurcation along the fact/law line may hold some ap-
peal. But this result is particularly perplexing in the wake of 
Stern’s directive that neither Congress nor the judiciary can 
move matters of general law110—for example, ordinary state 
and common-law claims—outside of Article III courts because 
those tribunals have no more expertise in these questions of 
law than the Article III courts do.111 Yet, the intertwining doc-
trine permits precisely that outcome: the removal of a claim en-
titled to Article III determination. This occurs as a result not of 
the legislature’s enactment of a superseding right but instead 
through the enactment of a merely related statutory right or 
regime. In justifying this encroachment upon Article III, the 
Court noted that bifurcation could lead to inconsistent out-
 
 106.  See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2615 (2011) (recognizing 
that recent Supreme Court cases have failed to provide clear guidance on the 
balancing test); see also Fallon, supra note 27, at 932 & n.114 (observing that 
not only does the balancing test “lack[] definition” but “[e]ven its coherence is 
questionable”). 
 107.  See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593 
(1985). 
 108. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54 (1989). 
 109.  See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615. 
 110.  See id. at 2619 (reasoning that Congress, the President, and the Arti-
cle III judiciary lack the power to authorize non-Article III adjudication of Ar-
ticle III matters). 
 111.  See id. at 2614 (holding that state and common-law claims inter-
twined with federal rights can permissibly be adjudicated in non-Article III 
forums). 
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comes, thereby undermining the regulatory regime.112 But this 
argument rests upon the proposition that the agency may well 
reach a decision contrary to the law, yet not subject to appeal to 
the Article III courts absent a constitutional violation.  
Given the Court’s oft-repeated statement that the courts 
are meant to decide the law, but that delegation of fact-finding 
to a non-Article III actor typically does not create any constitu-
tional difficulty, what observations would civil procedure and 
systems design offer about the potential structure of these cas-
es in which Article III and non-Article III claims are inter-
twined?  
With respect to fact-finding, permitting initial fact-finding 
to occur in the non-Article III tribunal is not problematic—
given both the tribunal’s specialization and core competency 
and lack of Article III concern with non-constitutional facts. To 
the contrary, this comports with the existing structure of the 
courts, which frequently rely with a high degree of deference 
upon the recommendations of special masters, magistrate judg-
es, and other factfinders.113 
But what about allowing the agency to make legal deter-
minations? If an agency has rulemaking power over the claim, 
it is easier to see that the adjudication is intertwined with the 
agency’s executive and legislative roles. In these cases, the 
agency may have superior information as to its own intent in 
promulgating the rule in question. Moreover, it may utilize in-
dividual cases to either clarify the interstices of these rules or 
to resolve cases on an ad hoc basis until it becomes clear what 
rules should be promulgated. In these situations, the rulemak-
ing and judicial processes may work hand-in-hand.114 In these 
cases, the resolution of particular claims is traditionally viewed 
as intertwined with the legislative function, allowing the famil-
 
 112.  See id. at 2615. 
 113. As a formal matter, the decisions of special masters and magistrates 
are reviewed de novo, under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 53 and 72. How-
ever, notwithstanding the existence of de novo review, as a practical matter, 
the courts have rarely disturbed these findings. See, e.g., Crowell v. Benson, 
285 U.S. 22, 51–52 (1932) (“While the reports of masters and commissioners in 
such cases [equity and admiralty] are essentially of an advisory nature, it has 
not been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based 
upon evidence, in the absence of errors of law, and the parties have no right to 
demand that the court shall redetermine the facts thus found.” (footnote omit-
ted)); accord Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2014). 
 114.  See Morrison, supra note 100, at 98. 
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iar deference to agency interpretations of their organic stat-
utes. 
2. Institutional Design Considerations 
However, such a deferential structure does raise a different 
institutional design concern. To the extent that the separation 
of powers exists to ensure that the executive, legislative, and 
judicial functions are left to separate officials, there is struc-
tural value in allowing mere deference to agency adjudication 
on the law. Indeed, such a separation encourages clear ex ante 
rulemaking and thus clarifies the parties’ obligations, while a 
blending of these functions does not.115 Thus, from an institu-
tional design standpoint, some degree of oversight may be pref-
erable. This oversight may take many forms, ranging from 
statutory authorization for direct review, to the availability of a 
constitutional challenge to a final order.  
But to the extent that the tribunal is either devoid of rule-
making authority or is interpreting general law rather than its 
own organic statute, the case is far weaker.116 The knowledge of 
institutional history or special knowledge of the law is then de-
veloped as a specialized outside adjudicator. As such, it is the 
specialization, rather than the agency or branch in which one is 
placed, that is providing the identified benefits. Thus, to the ex-
tent that merely a specialized tribunal is sought, these can be 
created within Article III through jurisdictional provisions.117 
From an institutional design standpoint, the existing doc-
trine is thus too deferential in recognizing the superiority of 
any tribunal tailored to a particular federal statutory regime. 
But is it also too narrow? Is there a case for permitting Con-
gress to utilize non-Article III tribunals for common fact pat-
terns, rather than merely for common legal questions? Recent 
innovations in procedure suggest a number of reasons one 
might answer yes.  
In the years since the Court developed the narrowly-
tailored question-of-law test, experience has shown the value of 
not just consolidating similar legal claims but factual ones. The 
observation that factual expertise adds value even across dra-
matically-varying legal regimes is now incorporated into the ex-
isting litigation system. Consider multi-district litigation. For 
 
 115.  See Revesz, supra note 79, at 1115. 
 116.  See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615. 
 117.  See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 75. 
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years class actions moved forward based upon a common legal 
question, but MDL is not so constrained. Instead, claims with a 
similar factual basis are joined even if the legal claims are very 
different,118 permitting a single judge to become an expert in the 
intertwined facts of the cases, streamlining discovery and 
avoiding the duplication of judicial and legal resources.119 
To the extent that the Supreme Court seeks to facilitate 
Congress’s innovation through assigning factual determina-
tions to a specialized tribunal,120 the existing doctrine over-
emphasizes the importance of tying this tribunal to a narrow 
statutory regime. The presence of a public regulatory regime in 
modern doctrine opens the door not only to deference on rights 
emanating from that statute but also to any intertwined pri-
vate rights arising under the common law or state law. In con-
trast, the lack of a narrowly defined set of legal claims pre-
cludes Congress from utilizing the specialized tribunal as 
anything more than an adjunct, even if the divergent legal 
claims are tied to the same factual core.  
 
* * * 
 
Permitting a non-Article III entity to make legal determi-
nations pendent to factual specialization is paradoxical: Why 
should expertise in an area outside the concern of Article III 
(fact-finding)121 drive acquiescence by the constitutional courts 
as to their primary function (legal determinations)?122 Indeed, 
the Stern Court seemingly recognized as much, stating that the 
 
 118. For an introduction to MDL, see Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Mil-
ler, The Quasi-Class Action Method of Managing Multi-District Litigations: 
Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 110–11 (2010). 
 119.  See, e.g., In re Oil Spill, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La. 2012) (defining 
the class broadly and indicating a complex combination of legal and factual 
issues for resolution by the MDL); cf. Order and Reasons: Granting Final Ap-
proval of the Medical Benefits Class Action Settlement, In re Oil Spill, 910 F. 
Supp. 2d 891 (MDL NO. 2179); Order and Judgment Granting Final Approval 
of Economic and Property Damages Settlement and Confirming Certification 
of the Economic and Property Damages Settlement Class, In re Oil Spill, 910 
F. Supp. 2d 891 (E.D. La 2012) (MDL NO. 2179). 
 120.  See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615; Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1986); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 
46 (1932). 
 121.  See, e.g., Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51 (noting that fact specialists are fre-
quently employed within Article III and that their findings are typically dis-
turbed only where there is an error of law). 
 122.  See id. at 56, 64 (discussing the courts’ core role in determining ques-
tions of law). 
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rationale for authorizing a non-Article III court to hear claims 
laid in the existence of a “class of questions of fact”—not law—
“which are particularly suited to [the tribunal’s determina-
tion].”123 In the wake of Stern, the courts have adapted to the 
limits placed upon the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. 
Rather than withdrawing the referrals of Article III matters to 
the bankruptcy courts, the district courts have incorporated the 
bankruptcy judges as adjuncts.124 Consistent with the constitu-
tional requirements of Stern, Article I bankruptcy courts now 
cast their opinions on Article III matters as proposed orders for 
approval by the district courts.125 Just as in the days 
of Murray’s Lessee, the courts have given great practical defer-
ence to these opinions but still retain the authority to act as the 
final arbiter of what the law is in the rare cases in which this 
check is needed. 
The Court’s willingness to permit narrow delegations of ad-
judicative authority suggests an alternative basis for upholding 
these features of the administrative state. The Court is not de-
ferring to a delegation of judicial authority; rather, it is recog-
nizing that the method of rights enforcement for a particular 
federal statutory regime is a decision for Congress to make in 
its creation of the new right—and that it may keep this author-
ity, vest the execution in the executive branch or an agency, or 
structure the right as one susceptible to judicial enforcement. 
From this perspective, then, Congress can properly vest adjudi-
cative authority in the executive branch—but cannot bestow 
upon these non-Article III courts the ability to adjudicate even 
“intertwined” judicial cases and controversies. Quite simply, it 
cannot delegate judicial authority, but it remains free to exer-
cise or delegate its own powers, including deciding in what 
form to structure the enforcement of new public rights.126 This 
observation comports precisely with the original guidance of 
the Supreme Court, offered more than a century ago.127 
 
 123.  Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615. 
 124. See generally Executive Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. 
Ct. 2165 (2014) (upholding practice of permitting bankruptcy judges to adjudi-
cate matters in the first instance, so long as the district court then reviewed 
the opinion de novo, and holding that this is not inconsistent with Stern). 
 125.  See, e.g., In re City of Detroit, 504 B.R. 97, 135 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 
2013) (holding that Stern did not preclude jurisdiction). 
 126.  See Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process As 
Separation of Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1782 (2012). 
 127. See Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 274–76 (1855). 
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E. REVISITING THE INITIAL DOCTRINAL INTUITIONS 
Until the peak of the administrative state, Article III doc-
trine reflected a consistent intuition about the nature of non-
Article III tribunals’ structure and limits. As early as Murray’s 
Lessee, the Supreme Court held that adjudications by non-
Article III officers were constitutional where they effectuated a 
power granted to the executive or legislative branch,128 as these 
were by definition not granted to the Article III courts as part 
of the judicial power.129 While Congress could choose to delegate 
its own power to the judicial branch instead of the executive, its 
decision to do so remained entirely discretionary—and indeed 
would only be constitutional if framed as part of the judicial 
power.130 Conversely, the judicial power could not be withdrawn 
from the Article III courts in favor of the political branches; 
thus, no matter that was the “subject of a suit at the common 
law, or in equity, or admiralty” could be removed to a non-
Article III tribunal.131 
This theme continued through Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 
with the recognition that where an adjudication is “merely in 
aid of legislative or executive action . . . Congress may reserve 
to itself the power to decide, may delegate that power to execu-
tive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribunals.”132 Thus, 
non-Article III tribunals could permissibly adjudicate all mat-
ters “susceptible of legislative or executive determina-
tion . . . .”133 But, Congress could not remove any cases from the 
constitutional courts.134 Thus “the true test [of whether non-
Article III adjudication is constitutional] lies in the power un-
der which the court was created . . . .”135 
In Crowell v. Benson, the Court began to recognize the role 
of Congress as systems designer136 and the value of utilizing 
non-Article III tribunals to “furnish a prompt, continuous, ex-
 
 128.  Id. at 280–82 (cataloguing the various enumerated powers that can-
not be exercised by the political branches without ascertaining facts and ap-
plying law). 
 129.  Id. at 282. 
 130.  Id. at 284. 
 131.  Id.  
 132.  279 U.S. 438, 450–51 (1929). 
 133.  Id. at 453. 
 134.  Id. at 457–60. 
 135.  Id. at 459. 
 136. 285 U.S. 22, 49 (1932) (“Congress was at liberty to draw upon another 
system of procedure to equip the court with suitable and adequate means for 
enforcing the [substantive] law . . . .”). 
DODGE_5fmt 1/25/2015 1:04 PM 
934 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [99:905 
 
pert and inexpensive method” of dispute resolution.137 Yet, it 
continued to tie congressional innovation in procedure to the 
exertion of the legislative power, such that the scope of this 
power was only as broad as the legislative power.138 As a result, 
non-Article III adjudication was only permissible “in connection 
with the performance of the constitutional functions of the ex-
ecutive or legislative departments.”139 These themes continued 
to resonate through Atlas Roofing140 and Northern Pipeline.141 
Even as these conceptions were abandoned as too formalis-
tic to promote innovation in the modern administrative state,142 
the Court has continued to draw upon these animating concep-
tions.143 Most recently, in Stern v. Marshall, the Supreme Court 
analyzed the constitutionality of the delegation to the non-
Article III bankruptcy courts by exploring whether the powers 
they exerted were within the enumerated powers granted to 
the political branches, or instead were merely general judicial 
powers.144  
The modern doctrine broadened the definition of the legis-
lative power to include not merely federally created regulatory 
rights but also intertwined state or common law claims. This 
recasting of the test was undertaken in order to permit a 
broader array of non-Article III adjudications. But this vague 
directive is widely recognized as having created confusion and 
uncertainty because the courts are now expressly directed to 
find the “right” outcome through subjective balancing of an 
amorphous and ever-growing set of factors.145 This Part has ar-
gued that, far from its promise, the new test is less congruent 
 
 137.  Id. at 46. 
 138.  See id. at 50–51. 
 139.  Id. at 50. 
 140.  See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review 
Comm’n, 430 U.S. 442, 452–453, 462 (1977). 
 141.  See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64, 
67–76, 78–86 (1982). 
 142.  See Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 594 
(1985) (permitting non-Article III tribunals to adjudicate private rights claims, 
since “[t]o hold otherwise would be to erect a rigid and formalistic restraint on 
the ability of Congress to adopt innovative measures . . . .”). 
 143.  See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54–55 (1989) 
(focusing upon whether the claim is closely related to a valid legislative action 
under Article I); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 
845–46 (1986) (recognizing the adjudicative scheme as tied to the legislative 
power); Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 584. 
 144. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2612–13 (2011). 
 145. Id. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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with a functionalist or purposivist approach than its predeces-
sor. The balancing test is both over- and under-inclusive as 
against the normative goals identified by the Court. In con-
trast, analysis of the areas in which tribunals offer potential 
value, reveals precise congruence with the earlier intuitions. 
At a fundamental level, this Part suggests that the obser-
vations of modern systems design and procedure are consonant 
with the original intuitions of the First Congress and early Su-
preme Court doctrine. The notion that this single principle is 
robust enough to withstand the radical innovations in adjudica-
tion over the centuries—most recently the procedural revolu-
tions, creation of aggregative processes, and embrace of ADR—
suggests that it is worth considering whether this delegation 
approach may have continued force even as our modern state 
and conceptions of procedure continue to evolve. 
Correcting the erroneous assumption about the limits of 
procedural innovation in the Article III courts not only under-
mines the basis of the modern doctrine but also suggests that 
the abandonment of the early doctrine’s intuitions was not jus-
tified—at least when measured against the rationale provided 
by the Court. First, modern procedural and systems design the-
ory comport with the original understandings and intuitions of 
the Supreme Court about the nature of non-Article III adjudi-
cation and the constitutional powers from which it arose—not 
the current doctrine. Second, that delegation approach allows 
the preservation of the modern administrative state but sets 
important limitations on its expansion. These lines cohere pre-
cisely with the insights of procedure and systems design about 
the cases in which non-Article III adjudication offers a benefit 
over Article III adjudication. Third, it reinforces, rather than 
weakens, the separation of powers and checks and balances in-
herent in the system. It provides an inviolable core of Article III 
jurisdiction, while simultaneously affording the political 
branches the ability to operate non-Article III courts. Fourth, it 
provides a constitutional basis for the appellate review that 
many scholars have opined is necessary to the preservation of 
our constitutional system but for which, until now, it was diffi-
cult to provide a constitutional basis that was not so over-
inclusive as to invalidate broad swaths of the administrative 
state. 
 
* * * 
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This Part has argued that the assumptions underlying the 
Court’s modern doctrine are inconsistent with the operation of 
the existing Article III judicial system. If correct, it undermines 
the entire foundation of the balancing test, which expressly 
premised the necessity of permitting encroachment upon Arti-
cle III on these competing constitutional considerations. Equal-
ly important, the basis for the abandonment of the initial intui-
tions and conceptualization of non-Article III courts was 
without merit.  
These insights may lead to a new round of scholarly de-
bate. Some scholars will likely argue that these insights do not 
preclude the existence of other constitutional, structural, or 
normative reasons to abandon categorical Article III tests. Oth-
er scholars will likely argue that with these new insights it may 
well be the case that we can draw upon modern theory to con-
struct a system robust enough to withstand future changes and 
innovation in procedure and dispute resolution while preserv-
ing the core constitutional values. But, as these debates begin, 
it seems clear that we must shift our analysis to these second-
generation questions, given the demonstrated contradiction of 
the existing doctrine’s fundamental assumptions with existing 
judicial structures and capacity.  
III. THE INDIVIDUAL’S ARTICLE III PROTECTIONS  
Our legal system has long adhered to the notion that the 
parties to whom rights are granted are the best custodians of 
those rights. Thus, in keeping with broad notions of individual 
autonomy, parties may strategically deploy or waive the default 
tools of litigation consistent with their own self-interest.146 The 
doctrine’s reliance upon consent to the waiver of the individu-
al’s rights and protections under Article III is thus consistent 
with other waivers of procedural rights and due process protec-
tions, as well as the power of parties to opt-out of the public ad-
judication system and into arbitration.147  
 
 146.  See Kevin E. Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 510–11 (2011); Judith Resnik, Procedure As Con-
tract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005); Rhee, supra note 21, at 516. 
But see Robert G. Bone, Party Rulemaking: Making Procedural Rules Through 
Party Choice, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1329, 1354, 1368 (2012) (arguing arbitration of-
ten unfairly benefits one party); David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Proce-
dure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 393–95 (2014) (suggesting scholars promised 
too much when they argued in favor of arbitration). 
 147.  Cf. Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, The Unconscionability Game: Strategic 
Judging and the Evolution of Federal Arbitration Law, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
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In the context of private ordering, waivers of procedural 
rights have unquestionably enabled parties to obtain more ad-
vantageous arrangements tailored to their particular dispute 
than the default litigation system would otherwise provide.148 
But set against these benefits of private ordering are substan-
tial difficulties based upon the inability of individuals to 
properly assess the impact of waivers,149 particularly those em-
bedded in standardized consumer and employment agree-
ments.150 The merits of these competing conceptions of optimal 
deterrence and enforcement are well-documented and beyond 
the scope of this Article. But, in light of these ongoing questions 
about the ability of individuals to meaningfully consent to pro-
cedural modifications, one could plausibly question the viability 
of consent as a component of the Article III balancing test.  
In contrast to purely private ordering, public dispute sys-
tems design inherently involves Congress. To the extent that 
procedural modification has been critiqued for allowing parties 
to evade or under-enforce non-waivable substantive rights,151 
 
1420, 1422 (2008) (discussing the Supreme Court’s acceptance of arbitration 
agreements and the difficulties in nullifying them). 
 148.  See generally Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: 
An Economic Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 308–09 (1994) (recognizing that 
heightened accuracy is typically obtained only at a cost and arguing that the 
balance between efficiency and accuracy, with its resulting impact upon deter-
rence, is best made on a case-by-case basis); Michael L. Moffitt, Customized 
Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 461, 462 (2007) (arguing “for a fundamentally different conception of the 
rules governing litigation . . . as default rules, rather than as nonnegotiable 
parameters”); Scott & Triantis, supra note 21, at 856–78. 
 149. The failures are not merely the result of underinvestment or heuristic 
biases, but instead reflect information asymmetries compounded by unique 
barriers to effective consumer education present with respect to procedural 
terms. Many scholars have argued that individuals are inadequate protectors 
of their procedural rights, prompting calls for prohibitions on pre-dispute pro-
cedural waivers. Although historically private rights of action simultaneously 
served dual public and private purposes, effectuating both the interests in de-
terrence and compensation, recent procedural modifications have placed these 
purposes in tension. Companies have begun offering super-compensation to 
the individual in exchange for terms that will diminish overall deterrence, 
raising questions about the viability of individuals serving as de facto private 
attorneys general.  
 150.  See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitra-
tion Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants As a Hybrid Form of Employ-
ment Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 427–30 (2006); Ronald J. Mann & Travis 
Siebeneicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet Retail Contracting, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 984, 990 (2008); David Marcus, Some Realism About Mass 
Torts, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1949, 1980–81 (2008). 
 151.  See Dodge, supra note 21, at 773; Estlund, supra note 150, at 427–29. 
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these criticisms are ameliorated by congressional involvement 
because the determination of the optimal level of enforcement 
is inherently within the province of the legislative branch. 
Moreover, while information cost asymmetries can often pre-
vent meaningful consideration of the choice to consent,152 the 
public nature of these processes substantially reduces the 
asymmetry and permits the development of generic information 
assets and specialized counsel. And finally, to the extent that 
many regimes provide for consent to the non-Article III tribu-
nals to occur post-dispute, concerns with ex ante undervalua-
tion of procedural rights and lack of counsel may also be re-
duced.153  
This is not to say that there is no concern with the viability 
of consent in the public dispute systems context. To the contra-
ry, the involvement of Congress that ameliorates the concerns 
emerging from private ordering simultaneously gives rise to a 
new, unique set of concerns which has not been systemically 
explored in the dispute resolution and civil procedure litera-
ture.  
Section A questions the traditional wisdom that the exist-
ing doctrine’s preference for consent-based regimes enhances 
individual autonomy and outcomes. Indeed, the conventional 
analysis suggests that this creates competition, such that Con-
gress must create non-Article III tribunals that are superior to 
the baseline provided by the courts in order to obtain participa-
tion. But, as consent has become a mechanism for Congress to 
obtain non-Article III adjudication of matters otherwise re-
served to the constitutional courts, the opposite dynamic has 
occurred in some cases: Congress has diminished the substan-
tive or procedural rights of the parties in court. Thus, rather 
than competing to offer a better resolution mechanism, Con-
gress has handicapped the courts. Consent then cannot be said 
to establish that parties are obtaining better outcomes or pro-
cess than in the constitutional courts.  
Section B then turns to the conventional wisdom that while 
public non-Article III tribunals are a potential threat, private 
arbitrators do not pose any threat to Article III. This section 
 
 152.  See Dodge, supra note 21, at 791–92; Christine Jolls et al., A Behav-
ioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1541–47 (1998). 
 153.  See Jaime Dodge, Disaggregative Mechanisms, 62 EMORY L.J. 1253, 
1258–62 (2014); Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. 
Concepcion, Walmart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 
164 (2011). 
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argues that although this wisdom is generally true, it is not 
wholly precise—a distinction that is taking on increasing im-
portance with the rise of non-Article III adjudication, both pub-
lic and private. Transfers of the judicial power to competing 
branches not only deprive the constitutional courts of their 
power but also aggrandize the receiving branch—creating a 
stronger tip in the balance of powers. But, removing cases from 
the Article III courts and pairing this with the very limited re-
view available to an arbitral decision can impede the judicial 
function as well—particularly where it effectively insulates the 
underlying statute from constitutional review. This Section ex-
plores the rationale for a more careful consideration of the con-
tours of Congress’s power to enable all forms of non-Article III 
tribunals and to impair the constitutional courts’ review. Sec-
tion C then offers some concluding observations about the risks 
of the existing Article III doctrine to the individual’s rights and 
a mechanism for reconceptualizing consent in the Article III 
context. 
A. ARTICLE III WAIVERS: BULWARK OR LOOPHOLE IN 
INDIVIDUAL PROTECTIONS?  
The power of Congress as lawmaker to modify the expected 
value of a claim—even an existing claim—can be utilized to ob-
tain consent to regimes that have projected values inferior to 
those expected values in the default regime. Congress may ret-
roactively modify parties’ substantive rights and obligations, so 
long as the power is constitutionally exercised. Recognizing the 
uncertainty surrounding the ability of Congress to impair or 
eliminate a claim without running afoul of the prohibition on 
takings or equal protection, Congress may utilize procedural 
mechanisms to obtain the same diminution in the expected 
value of the plaintiff’s claim.  
By pairing an alteration of rights with the option of partic-
ipation in the legislative court, Congress can modify the ex post 
valuation of expected outcomes and obtain consent to an ex 
ante inferior regime.154 In order to maximally exercise this pow-
 
 154. The observations of this Part are sympathetic with previous Supreme 
Court cases and literature addressing the imposition of unconstitutional con-
ditions, in which although the condition is burdensome and potentially uncon-
stitutional, the citizen nevertheless expressly or impliedly consents because 
even with the unfair term the overall bargain is still favorable. See generally 
Am. Express, Inc. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobili-
ty LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1140 (2011); Peter B. Rutledge & Christopher 
R. Drahozal, Contract and Choice, 2013 BYU L. REV. 1. 
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er, Congress can consolidate claims in a district with a reputa-
tion for smaller verdicts, reducing the expected value of the 
claim—or in a district known for large verdicts, if it seeks to in-
crease the value of the claim.155 Equally important, forum selec-
tion can dramatically impact the likelihood of success on the 
merits—in some cases decreasing the likelihood of a favorable 
verdict by half.156 These dual impacts of forum shifting can 
thereby generate a substantial decrease (or increase) in the 
plaintiff’s expected recovery.157  
But Congress’s power is not limited to forum selection. 
Congress also has the power to modify procedure. It may there-
fore also elect to include changes to procedural mechanisms fol-
lowed by the court—such as changing the statute of limitations 
or limiting discovery—so long as the alterations do not drop be-
low the minimums required by due process. As party consent is 
not required for these modifications to become effective, the 
plaintiff’s new baseline expected recovery is not the original ex-
pected recovery, but this new dramatically different level of ex-
pected recovery—which I refer to as the ex post expected value.  
In addition to the direct value of the substantive or proce-
dural modifications, the very act of consolidation may further 
alter the ex post expected value. For example, consolidating 
claims in a single court, seeking to process hundreds or thou-
sands of complex mass-tort claims, may lead to a backlog.158 For 
many plaintiffs in these mass-tort cases, time is of the essence, 
as the recovery is necessary to pay for ongoing medical expens-
es or to replace lost income.159 Financing mechanisms may be 
available, but these various instruments all require a premium 
to be paid to the financier in one way or another. The dimin-
ished present value of the claims then further decreases the 
 
 155.  Cf. Debra Lyn Bassett, The Defendant’s Obligation To Ensure Ade-
quate Representation in Class Actions, 74 UMKC L. REV. 511, 529 & n.111 
(2006) (describing corporate lobbying for CAFA as prompted by the sentiment 
that federal courts are “less receptive” to class actions than state courts); Geof-
frey C. Hazard, Jr., Has the Erie Doctrine Been Repealed by Congress?, 156 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1629, 1629 (2008) (analyzing the legislative effect of widening the 
jurisdiction of federal courts through CAFA). 
 156. Christian N. Elloie, Are Pre-Dispute Jury Trial Waivers a Bargain for 
Employers over Arbitration? It Depends on the Employee, 76 DEF. COUNS. J. 
91, 96 (2009). 
 157. For discussion, see Dodge, supra note 21, at 740–41. 
 158.  See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617–18 (1997); 
Silver & Miller, supra note 118, at 176. 
 159.  See David Rosenberg, Mandatory-Litigation Class Action: The Only 
Option for Mass Tort Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 831, 833 (2002).  
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expected value at trial and, in turn, the settlement value for 
the plaintiff.  
Congress’s power to alter the applicable law can thus be 
used to substantially shift the plaintiff’s expected outcome, cre-
ating a new reality in which the party will consent to a regime 
even if it is significantly inferior to the original expected value 
of the claim. For the plaintiff, the original expected value is no 
longer an option; the choice is merely between the expected 
value in litigation (as modified by the congressional modifica-
tions) and the alternative expected value before the tribunal. 
Thus, if the ex post legislative modifications have diminished 
the value of the claim by half—as a mere forum selection clause 
could do, even absent other substantive or procedural altera-
tions—then the individual will rationally select the tribunal, 
even if the expected value is only sixty percent of the original 
expected value.160 By combining a variety of procedural modifi-
cations, the value of the claim can be reduced to approach that 
of a nuisance value claim—even if no substantive law modifica-
tions are made.161 And, to the extent that the uncertainty in the 
law is clarified to permit Congress to retroactively reduce liabil-
ity without triggering a takings claim, an even more direct ap-
proach to devaluing the Article III claim is available.162 
 
 160. For discussion of these pressures in the private context, see Samuel 
Issacharoff & D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox 
of Public Litigation, 74 LA. L. REV. 397, 401–03 (2014). 
 161.  Cf. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 
(2013) (holding that an arbitration clause rendering a claim at negative value 
did not preclude its enforcement). 
 162. While the “courts read laws as prospective in application unless Con-
gress has unambiguously instructed retroactivity,” this is a rule of statutory 
interpretation and does not bar the enactment of subsequent changes in law 
that affect already pending but not yet final cases. Vartelas v. Holder, 132 S. 
Ct. 1479, 1486 (2012); see also Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 894 (2012) (up-
holding conversion of copyright status from unprotected to protected, for a 
number of works already in the public domain and in existence prior to the 
statute’s enactment); AT&T Corp. v. Hulteen, 556 U.S. 701, 712–13 (2009) (re-
jecting a retroactive application of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act for lack 
of an express statement of retroactivity, noting that Congress must be the one 
to balance “‘potential unfairness of retroactive application and determine that 
it is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits’” (quoting 
Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272–73 (1994))); Landgraf, 511 
U.S. at 263, 270 (articulating non-retroactivity rule in light of “considerations 
of fair notice, reasonable reliance, and settled expectations”); cf. United States 
v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1853 (2012) (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) (“Having worked no change in the law, and instead having inter-
preted a statutory provision without an established meaning, the Depart-
ment’s regulation does not have an impermissible retroactive effect.” (citing 
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Recognizing that ex post Congress can decrease or elimi-
nate the value of the plaintiff’s claim, it then becomes obvious 
that its control over the plaintiff’s BATNA is substantial 
enough to overwhelm any meaningful choice.163 Indeed, while 
the plaintiff retains the autonomy to consent or not, the choice 
is not a reflection of preference for the proposed regime over the 
original default rights, rather, it is the better of two inferior op-
tions. As a result, in contrast to the usual role of consent in 
signaling legitimacy, the individual is more likely to perceive 
the consent as having been the result of force.164 As such, it is 
substantially less likely to trigger the psychological buy-in nec-
essary to either improve satisfaction with outcomes or legitima-
cy traditionally associated with consent in an ADR framework. 
But is this pairing of modification of litigation processes 
with creation of the legislative court mere speculation? No. The 
September 11 Fund exemplifies this precise concurrent modifi-
cation: all claims were consolidated in the Southern District of 
New York and damages capped at the value of the defendants’ 
available insurance coverage.165 Plaintiffs were then given the 
option of participating in the Fund, conditional upon waiver of 
their litigation rights—including those against the airlines, 
whom Congress expressly noted it was seeking to bailout 
through the Act. For those who participated in the Fund, relief 
came within months.166 In contrast, for the few that remained 
in the litigation system, justice was long-delayed: the final law-
suit was only recently settled, having not reached trial a decade 
after the tragedy.167  
 
Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 741, 744, n.3 (1996); Manhattan 
Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm’r, 297 U.S. 129, 136 (1936))). 
 163. BATNA refers to the “Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement.” 
For any party, whether to accept the offer in question is based in substantial 
part on what the next best option to accepting the terms would be. ROGER 
FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITH-
OUT GIVING IN 96–107 (Bruce Patton ed., 2d ed. 1991) (coining the term 
“BATNA”); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Separate and Not Equal: Integrating 
Civil Procedure and ADR in Legal Academia, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 681, 
698 (2005) (exploring the concept of BATNA in the litigation process). 
 164. This theme again resounds in the literature on private parties. See, 
e.g., Issacharoff & Rave, supra note 160, at 401–03; Resnik, supra note 146, at 
632. 
 165.  In re September 11 Litig., 600 F. Supp. 2d 549, 551 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 166.  Id. at 551–52. 
 167. Order Granting Joint Motion To Approve Settlement Agreement, Can-
tor Fitzgerald & Co. v. Am. Airlines Inc., No. 21 MC 101 (AKH), 2014 WL 
250255 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 15, 2014). 
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Congress’s authority to legislate wields a similar, albeit 
distinct, formal power over defendants; it may modify expected 
outcomes through both procedural and substantive modifica-
tions, so long as it does not run afoul of constitutional con-
straints. But corporations are also uniquely susceptible to in-
formal mechanisms, as Congress may raise the specter of 
disadvantageous prospective modifications to the law in the 
form of increased regulation, increased liability, or decreases in 
favorable treatment such as subsidies or liability caps. This 
threat is particularly persuasive where the liability is industry-
wide, as some mass-torts cases have been. While this threat 
may seem far-fetched and amorphous, history demonstrates its 
power: Consider BP’s response to the Gulf Oil Spill. Facing 
public outcry as well as concerted pressure from the President 
and Congress, BP agreed to create a fund that was 266 times 
the size of its anticipated liability under existing law.168 While 
the BP process was structured as a private response, insiders 
widely acknowledged that it was, in part, a response to political 
pressure that could equally have been deployed to obtain con-
sent to a public process.169 
Congress’s power to legislate provides an inherently 
asymmetric power, which it may use in some circumstances to 
obtain consent from parties to a non-Article III regime. This is 
not to suggest that Congress will always exert this power.170 
Rather, the contention is simply that to the extent that Con-
gress has this inherent power, it diminishes the value of con-
sent as a check upon Congress. Indeed, given Congress’s ability 
to modify one’s substantive and procedural rights, it can create 
structures in which the parties are substantially incentivized to 
 
 168. Liability under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA) is limited to all 
cleanup costs plus $75 million in damages. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (2012). The Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund then pays out up to $1 billion per incident. 26 
§ U.S.C. 9509(c)(2) (2012). By contrast, BP has authorized up to $20 billion to 
be paid through its claims fund, although only $11 billion has been paid on 
claims thus far. Compensating the People and Communities Affected, BP, 
http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/gulf-of-mexico-restoration/deepwater 
-horizon-accident-and-response/compensating-the-people-and-communities 
-affected.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2014). 
 169.  See Jackie Calmes, Obama Plans First Oval Office Speech To Put 
Pressure on BP, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/ 
06/14/us/14spill.html. 
 170.  See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdic-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 885–86 (2011) (noting that the Article I require-
ments of bicameralism and presentment check the power of Congress to enact 
jurisdiction-stripping legislation). 
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waive their Article III rights. As exemplified by the September 
11 Fund, even where the parties ultimately consent, these 
choices neither enhance legitimacy nor reflect a preference for 
the non-Article III system. Rather, they represent a preference 
for the tribunal over the Article III courts ex post of the legisla-
tive modifications of either substantive or procedural rights.  
While consent is thus not serving the function of protecting 
the individual in the way that has been commonly assumed, it 
also creates risks for the structural role of Article III. The next 
Section explores the structural consequences that result from 
the doctrinal safe-harbor the Supreme Court has created 
around consent. 
B. THE STRUCTURAL THREAT OF CONSENT 
The Supreme Court has broadly held that arbitration au-
thorized by the Federal Arbitration Act and other, narrower 
schemes providing for private arbitration do not pose a threat 
to the separation of powers.171 Given the ability of individuals to 
contract to remove most claims from the courts, whether by set-
tlement or selection of a private dispute resolution mechanism, 
most scholars do not even consider these structures in analyz-
ing threats to Article III.172 Rather, the Court and scholars have 
assumed that Article III is not undermined because the shift in 
power is to a private entity at the behest of private parties. 
This Section argues that this is not necessarily correct; Article 
III can be threatened by some public authorizations of private, 
as well as public, adjudicators. Indeed, when this assumption is 
explored in more depth, it becomes clear that the checks and 
balances of the Constitution can be undermined not only by 
competing public tribunals but also in limited circumstances by 
private tribunals. This Section posits that a more considered 
and nuanced approach to analyzing the constitutionality of the-
se regimes is necessary to preserve Article III values.  
Where Congress utilizes structural or procedural provi-
sions, or a combination thereof, to incentivize the selection of 
private arbitrators, it can have the power to undermine or pre-
 
 171. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013); 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 854–55 (1986).  
 172. Indeed, the discussion of arbitration provisions is notably absent from 
the leading federal courts literature. See supra note 27. In contrast, some pro-
cedural scholars have suggested constitutional complications from arbitration, 
but these have generally not obtained traction with the courts. See, e.g., Bruhl, 
supra note 147, at 1421–22. 
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clude obtainment of the core structural functions of Article III. 
Because systems design does not claim to define the constitu-
tional functions of the courts, it can consider some of the more 
common functions typically attributed to the courts and the 
consequence of private adjudication upon the courts. 
One potential structural role is to invalidate unconstitu-
tional laws. If this is a structural role of the constitutional 
courts, then effectuation of Article III must provide a mecha-
nism for either direct review or collateral attack upon the stat-
ute. If this constitutional power is one that cannot be impaired 
by Congress, then the further limitation must be imposed that 
the legislation cannot mandate deference to a non-Article III 
court on this issue that is any greater than that ordinarily ap-
plied to legislative or executive actions. 
Another potential structural role is to clarify the law 
through the development of precedent. Through the develop-
ment of precedent, the obligations of parties are clarified and 
Congress is able to act to modify the statute to the extent that 
the interpretation given by the courts either reveals problems 
with the statute or is contrary to its policy preferences. The 
one-off agreement of parties typically does not meaningfully in-
terfere with this process, as other cases remain available to de-
velop precedent. However, in disparate areas of law, it can be 
observed that certain issues typically evade appellate review as 
a result of the interplay between substantive and procedural 
provisions, such that parties either perceive the risk of appeal 
as too great173 or meaningless.174 The widespread use of private 
arbitrators can yield the same effect because arbitration deci-
sions are typically binding only upon the immediate parties and 
are not required to state their reasoning or provide analysis, 
unless requested by the parties. It is for this reason that per-
mitting parties to select from a large or even unlimited body of 
private arbitrators is not comparable to simply allowing the 
matter to be litigated in state court, as state court decisions can 
provide precedent within the state as well as typically provid-
ing a written basis for the decision that can act as persuasive 
authority in other courts’ analyses. 
 
 173. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1752 (2011) 
(“Faced with even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be 
pressured into settling questionable claims.”). 
 174. For example, the Bankruptcy Code is structured to reduce the incen-
tive to appeal. See McKenzie, supra note 99, at 772. 
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For some scholars this may be substantially untroubling—
if Congress chooses not to have a unified body of precedent 
against which to draft future legislation, this is entirely within 
the function of the legislature and thus within the discretion of 
Congress. Moreover, if a pool of experienced arbitrators devel-
ops within a specified area, those arbitrators may form infor-
mal networks, rely upon each other’s views as persuasive, and 
ultimately begin to develop a body of arbitral law.175  
For other scholars, this may prove more troubling. For the-
se scholars, the value of precedent is not simply a benefit to 
Congress but also to the public in understanding their obliga-
tions under the law.176 Equally important, these scholars argue 
that it is only through public adjudication that the public can 
become informed about problems in the law necessary not only 
to shaping their own interactions with the parties but also to be 
informed civic participants capable of advocating for legislative 
change. For these scholars, settlement and arbitration under-
mine the public function of adjudication.177 Given these in-
sights, the next Section turns to considering how these cri-
tiques shape and can be incorporated into the existing doctrine 
and theory.  
C. RETHINKING THE ROLE AND LIMITS OF CONSENT 
In the past few years, procedural scholars have vigorously 
debated the origins of consent and waiver in an attempt to dis-
cern the extent to which private ordering can customize the 
public adjudicative process. As proceduralists frame the debate, 
the question is whether (1) the default rule permits waiver in 
the absence of a legislative prohibition or conflict with other 
law, or (2) the individual merely has the power to contract 
away his own right to take certain actions, which are enforcea-
ble only with legislative imprimatur or at the discretion of the 
judiciary. For our purposes, we can conceive of this as asking 
whether the individual’s autonomy over his claim includes only 
the limited power to waive his own rights or instead whether 
 
 175. For an interesting discussion of these views, see Michael A. Scodro, 
Note, Arbitrating Novel Legal Questions: A Recommendation for Reform, 105 
YALE L.J. 1927, 1951–52 (1996). 
 176. Id. at 1942–46. 
 177. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 
(1984); David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 
GEO. L.J. 2619, 2633 (1995). 
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this waiver is preclusive as to both individual and public rights 
absent a conflict with existing law.  
But these same questions emerge with respect to Article 
III: When an individual waives his Article III rights and con-
sents to a non-Article III forum, is he waiving only his own per-
sonal right? If the individual is merely waiving his own right, 
then the court retains the jurisdiction to assess any structural 
challenge to the non-Article III tribunal. But if one takes the 
view that his waiver is not so limited, then his waiver has the 
capacity to impair or eliminate the court’s jurisdiction entirely. 
From this perspective, the debate among constitutional law and 
federal courts scholars has failed to grapple with many of the 
concerns about the nature and role of adjudication raised by 
the systems design and civil procedure commentators.  
To the extent that Article III attempted to promote the le-
gitimacy of government by providing a fair forum to the indi-
vidual, systems design provides two observations. First, to the 
extent that political control or pandering may impact upon the 
fairness of adjudication, the availability of opt-out provides a 
ready check—if the non-Article III tribunal is known to be cor-
rupt or otherwise not impartial and parties have the capacity to 
select a private arbitrator, they will do so. A high rate of opt-
out will then reduce the number of cases before the corrupt 
body and, in turn, its power in obtaining the preferred outcome. 
The high opt-out rate may also serve as a signal to legislatures, 
and potentially media, of the problem. Thus, there may be less 
concern from an individual rights perspective with non-Article 
III forums if the parties are permitted to engage in private or-
dering. 
But this observation is limited in two key ways. One limi-
tation is the need for both parties to consent to the alternative 
tribunal; thus, if the parties are able to identify the direction of 
the bias ex ante, before they agree on a forum or perhaps even 
contract, the party favored by the bias will not accede—leaving 
in place the default forum selected by Congress. The other limi-
tation exists where the tribunal is one focused upon frequent, 
quick public funds adjudications, where allowing for a private 
tribunal is largely impractical. It is for this reason that some 
form of direct or indirect Article III review is necessary to en-
sure that no illegal or unconstitutional bias is influencing the 
non-Article III public tribunal. 
Second, the analysis reveals that consent is an inferior 
predictor of a legislative court’s burden upon the structural and 
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individual purposes of Article III. Because of the unique ability 
of Congress to control both the substantive and procedural 
rules that will govern the adjudicative process, it can create 
structures in which parties are incentivized to surrender the 
protections of Article III in order to obtain better individual 
outcomes. Although the parties may each make a rational 
choice to waive their rights, this can create an impediment to 
the effectuation of the structural purposes of Article III with 
respect to both the checks it imposes on the other branches and 
the balance of power between branches.  
To this point, this Article has focused upon identifying the 
points at which civil procedure’s insights suggest a conflict be-
tween the Supreme Court’s stated normative goals and the doc-
trine articulated to reach those ends. The next Part turns to the 
impact these observations have for the competing constitution-
al theories offered by scholars. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES FOR ARTICLE III DOCTRINE AND 
THEORY  
Each of the dominant modes of scholarly analysis has, like 
the doctrine, proven to have shortcomings or pitfalls. Many 
scholars regard the pursuit of original intent as an elusive goal, 
while arguing that any literal interpretation of the text would 
be impossible to implement without invalidating large swaths 
of the administrative state.178 Some scholars view such an end 
as impractical and normatively undesirable, while others argue 
that the agency adjudicators could simply be converted to Arti-
cle III judges—notwithstanding the uproar that occurred when 
the far smaller cadre of bankruptcy judges were considered for 
Article III status.179 Others argue that the key functions of Arti-
cle III can be attained through appellate review or the broader 
set of checks permitted under the inferior tribunals account. 
But appellate review has been criticized as invalidating too 
many entrenched government structures, while the inferior tri-
bunals account has struggled to establish a broad base of sup-
port.  
The current academic literature cries out for a synthesis of 
the textualist and originalist insights with those of the more 
functionalist scholars. The goal of this Part is not to bury the 
 
 178.  See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 38, at 223–24. 
 179.  See Resnik, supra note 92, at, 2594–95 (1998) (“[The] judiciary has 
also sought to preserve itself as a small cadre of life-tenured judges, to be dis-
tinguished from an expanding federal non life-tenured judiciary.”). 
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existing theories. To the contrary, each offers an important part 
of the constitutional picture, buttressed by persuasive histori-
cal evidence and considered normative claims. The solution to 
the problem of Article III is then not to jettison these observa-
tions, but to weave these strands of scholarship into a coherent 
narrative that draws its strength, in turn, from the strengths of 
each of these—heretofore, competing—theories.  
While the insights of civil procedure do not support every 
constitutional theory—and indeed, explicitly contradict some 
theories—they take steps to create common ground among a 
number of influential approaches. This Part explores the in-
sights of certain of these accounts, demonstrating how correct-
ing the erroneous assumptions of the past could be used by fed-
eral courts and constitutional scholars to recast each of these 
theories. For many theorists, the analysis of this Article may 
serve to fill gaps within their existing approaches or provide 
new analytic foundations.  
As a procedural scholar, my goal in this Part is not to ad-
vance any one constitutional theory nor any one particular way 
in which the insights of procedure should be fitted to these the-
ories. Rather, it is to begin to demonstrate some of the many 
ways that constitutional scholars could employ civil procedure 
to expand and defend their existing scholarly approaches. The 
ways in which this can be done are myriad, the insights that 
can be drawn nearly unlimited—those here are but one set, of-
fered not as the sole answer or even the right answer but as an 
illustration of what is possible and as a call to this new line of 
scholarship. 
Yet, with these caveats, the analysis yields an intriguing 
feature: as these theories are modified in light of civil proce-
dure, previously disparate theories of Article III begin to con-
verge on a common set of understandings. The theory of this 
Article then becomes not only consonant with each of these 
modes of analysis, but may provide a heretofore unarticulated 
common foundation that future doctrine may be built upon.  
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC/PRIVATE RIGHTS APPROACH 
Although early Article III doctrine spoke in terms of public 
and private rights, for a long period scholars rejected the rights 
distinction as an indeterminate test that could not function 
within our modern administrative state. But in recent years, 
Caleb Nelson and others have persuasively argued that the dis-
tinction between public and private rights is not only a histori-
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cally robust phenomenon, incorporated into both the state and 
federal systems, but also remains predictive to this day.180 Un-
der this approach, public rights are those exercised on behalf of, 
or for the benefit of, the people and are susceptible to non-
Article III determination.181 Core private rights, in contrast, are 
those natural rights to security, liberty, and private property, 
which cannot be abridged except through due process.182 This 
central tenet of our constitutional system provides the impetus 
for the allocation of powers within the Constitution.183 Indeed, 
as Nelson notes, courts and commentators have agreed that 
these core private rights cannot be adjudicated by the executive 
or legislature, but instead are reserved to the Article III 
courts.184 Finally, private privileges—those rights granted by 
public authorities to further public policy, rather than rights 
emanating from the Lockean state of nature—could be struc-
tured by Congress to operate as either public rights or as core 
private rights.185 Under this approach, the central role of the 
Article III judiciary is the adjudication of these core private 
rights.186 The other, public rights were the province of the polit-
ical branches, which could chose to assert or waive these rights 
categorically or individually, or delegate their determination to 
an official or tribunal.187  
For adherents of the public/private framework, this Article 
could provide one potential bridge to operationalizing the pub-
lic/private rights insight within the structure of the Constitu-
tion. First, the conception of assigning the judiciary the role of 
protecting private rights, while granting the political branches 
the control over public and quasi-public rights, fits precisely 
with the unique capacities of non-Article III federal tribunals—
as distinct from Article III judges, state court judges, and pri-
vate arbitrators. Second, this analysis lends support to the 
treatment of federal statutory rights as inherently under the 
aegis of Congress, which can design these private privileges ex-
isting at the largesse of the government to be exercised either 
like public rights (through the political branches and, most 
 
 180. Nelson, supra note 2795, at 559. 
 181.  Id. at 566. 
 182.  Id. at 566–67; accord John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional 
Power, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2513, 2516 (1998). 
 183. Nelson, supra note 27, at 567. 
 184. Id. at 569. 
 185.  Id. at 567. 
 186.  Id. at 569–70. 
 187.  Id. at 570–71. 
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commonly, an administrative agency) or as private rights (des-
ignated for judicial determination). This approach then com-
ports precisely with the notion of mandatory judicial jurisdic-
tion in core areas of private rights and constitutional law, but 
an initial allocation of authority to the political branches for 
public rights and quasi-private privileges—as posited by pub-
lic/private rights theorists. Moreover, it is consistent with early 
doctrine, which attributed non-Article III adjudication to execu-
tive and legislative functions, including federal statutorily cre-
ated rights, which were said to exist only by the largesse of 
government.  
Despite widespread critiques of public/private rights theory 
as not able to meaningfully define a modern doctrine,188 the in-
sights of this Article suggest that the theory can be operational-
ized into a workable modern doctrine. Using these insights, 
public/private rights theorists can demonstrate that not only 
did the public/private distinction drive the allocation of the 
separation of powers and early Article III doctrine, but that 
these intuitions align with our most modern doctrine. Under 
this approach, we can return to the sanctity of Article III ex-
tolled by the Roberts Court, without invalidating the modern 
administrative state. This becomes possible by recognizing that 
public rights and quasi-public rights are commended not to the 
judiciary in the first instance but to the political branches.  
From this perspective, there is no “removal” of the judicial 
power to non-Article III tribunals. Instead, the claims are ini-
tially assigned to the political branches, which may determine 
these claims. If Congress chooses to do so, it may, of course, 
delegate these claims to the judiciary—so long as it does so in a 
manner consistent with the judicial form (e.g., making the 
claim a case or controversy, not an advisory opinion, and so 
forth). In these cases, the claims are placed within the judicial 
power—expanding the power in essence to a new set of claims 
that would not otherwise have been within the judicial power. 
In contrast, private rights claims lay at the core of the guaran-
tees of Article III. These claims cannot be removed from the Ar-
ticle III courts in favor of a non-Article III tribunal.  
 
 188.  See, e.g., Redish, supra note 27, at 204–05; Saphire & Solimine, supra 
note 27, at 111–20. Converting one’s mode of constitutional analysis is a pro-
ject far broader than the scope of this paper. Rather, the point here is simply 
to illustrate the consonance between the main modes of analysis and the con-
clusions offered here. 
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B. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES AND 
ROLES 
While public/private rights theorists focus upon the under-
lying nature of the right, one could argue that this distinction 
drove the allocation of powers between the branches, but now 
that those allocations have been made, the constitutional allo-
cation should drive our Article III doctrine. For theorists fo-
cused upon the separation of powers, the insights of this Article 
provide a powerful, pragmatic, and functionalist rejoinder to 
critics. Indeed, while a separation of powers approach is closely 
tied to the constitutional text and typically more formalist in its 
approach, this Article’s insights could be used by these scholars 
to demonstrate that it has no less functional power than more 
subjective or expressly pragmatic theories. 
1. Reconceptualizing Separation of Powers  
As catalogued in Murray’s Lessee, many of the most essen-
tial functions assigned to the executive and legislative branch-
es—from collecting public taxes to determining when to call out 
the militia—involve the application of law to fact.189 As to these 
functions, it clearly cannot be said that they are therefore the 
sole province of the judicial branch, as they have been explicitly 
assigned to the other branches by the Constitution. With the 
evolution of the doctrine, these came to be viewed as areas of 
overlapping powers in which Congress had the authority to de-
cide which of the competing potential holders of the power 
should be assigned the power.190 This conception has become 
the foundational assumption upon which much of the Article 
III doctrine and theory is built.  
But, if carried to its logical conclusion, the result is sub-
stantially troubling. If basic executive tasks, like calling out the 
militia, are deemed susceptible to either the adjudicative or ex-
ecutive power at the option of Congress, then Congress would 
hold the power to remove essential components of the executive 
branch’s expressly granted authority—in contravention of the 
Constitution.  
 
 189. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 280–81 (1855). 
 190. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609, 2612 (2011) (finding 
“that the three branches are not hermetically sealed from one another” and 
cataloguing the areas in which Congress may utilize non-Article III adjudica-
tion). 
DODGE_5fmt 1/25/2015 1:04 PM 
2015] NON-ARTICLE III TRIBUNALS 953 
 
This suggests a second insight, specifically in the way to 
conceive of these areas of overlap: in the formation of these tri-
bunals, Congress is not permitted to remove powers of the oth-
er branches, as this would affect the balance of powers.191 In-
stead, Article III courts have certain core functions and related 
powers, which cannot be removed by the other branches—just 
as the other branches each have their own enumerated powers 
and roles.192 But the other branches may delegate their powers 
to the Article III courts, granting the courts additional pow-
ers.193 To do so, the matter must be structured as one suscepti-
ble to the judicial power.194 From this perspective, then, Con-
gress is not removing authority from the courts; rather, it is 
deciding whether to supplement the courts’ core jurisdiction 
with additional cases within the permissive jurisdiction set 
forth in Article III.195 
The constitutional basis for the authority of these tribunals 
comes neither from an amorphous balancing of the intrusion 
upon Article III196 nor from the inferior nature of the tribunal,197 
but from the tribunals’ exercise of a power granted by the Con-
stitution to the executive or legislative branch. Conceived in 
this manner, the historical exceptions that have long defied 
categorization are not one-off oddities198 nor do they require a 
capacious conception of inferiority.199 Instead, each of these tri-
bunals serves an enumerated executive or legislative power, fit-
ting neatly within the delegation approach, and thus do not 
need to be conceived as special historical exceptions. 
The approach resonates not only with the Court’s early in-
tuitions but also with the powers granted in the Constitution. 
As to those powers commended to Congress by Article I, the 
 
 191. This theme has remained within the background of Article III doctrine 
from the first cases to the most recent, although the faithfulness to its execu-
tion has varied and its form shifted. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609; Mur-
ray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 283–85. 
 192. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609; Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
at 283–85. 
 193. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609; Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
at 283–85. 
 194. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609; Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
at 283–85. 
 195. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609; Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
at 283–85. 
 196. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 197. Fallon, supra note 27, at 938–39. 
 198. Contra Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 199. Contra Pfander, supra note 27. 
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Constitution concurrently granted the ability “[t]o make all 
laws . . . necessary and proper for carrying into [e]xecution” 
those powers.200 The ability of Congress to permit the appoint-
ment of officers to carry out the determinations necessary to its 
Article I powers has not been questioned and, indeed, followed 
from the English tradition.201 With the expansion of the nation 
and complexity of the modern age, Congress increasingly dele-
gated authority to executive branch officials.202 These delega-
tions to administrative agencies or legislative courts must be 
“directed to the execution of one or more of [Congress’s as-
signed] powers.”203 Thus conceived, these are not delegations of 
judicial authority reserved by Article III but instead of the leg-
islative branch’s authority pursuant to Article I. The Court has 
long held that “Congress may reserve to itself” the powers 
granted by Article I, but if it chooses to delegate its powers, 
‘[t]he mode of determining matters of this class is completely 
within congressional control . . . [and it] may delegate that 
power to executive officers, or may commit it to judicial tribu-
nals.”204 
In addition to legislative functions, non-Article III courts 
may hear properly delegated executive matters.205 Courts mar-
tial have long been recognized as derivative of the President’s 
power as the Commander in Chief.206 So, too, the ability to 
make and ratify treaties that provide for international tribu-
nals or courts has been acknowledged by the Supreme Court as 
an extension of the foreign affairs powers commended to the 
President, with the consent of the Senate—and thus not a vio-
lation of Article III.207  
Considering non-Article III courts as an executive or legis-
lative delegation, rather than a superior adjudicative forum, is 
also consistent with the comparative advantage of these tribu-
 
 200. U.S. CONST. art. I, § R. 8, cl. 18. 
 201. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 281–82 (1855). 
 202. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 452 (1929) (discussing Con-
gress’s practice of initially retaining the power to decide claims against the 
government and later determination that this was “a heavy burden,” resulting 
in Congress granting the power to hear these claims to the Court of Claims).  
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. at 451; accord Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281–82.  
 205. Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 281–82. 
 206. Id.  
 207. For an excellent discussion, see generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET 
AL., HART AND WESCHLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
363–67 (6th ed. 2009).  
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nals. Modern procedural innovations have demonstrated that 
the Article III courts can serve each of the adjudicative aims 
identified by the court as justifying the burden upon Article III 
worked by non-Article III courts: negotiation, arbitration, fact 
specialization, and legal specialization. It is instead in those in-
stances where the fact-finding and application to law is serving 
either an executive function or a legislative function that the 
Article I court can provide a systemic benefit not available 
within the Article III courts.  
From a structural perspective, this inversion of the tradi-
tional conception has some appeal. It permits theories that in-
sulate a core of Article III that cannot be intruded upon by the 
other branches, in contrast with the current doctrine’s ac-
ceptance of intrusions upon even the formerly sacrosanct area 
of private rights.208 At the same time, it cabins the use of non-
Article III courts to those areas in which they provide an identi-
fiable systemic benefit as opposed to Article III courts.209  
2. Creating a Sacrosanct Core to the Judicial Power 
As the Supreme Court explained in Murray’s Lessee, non-
Article III courts are only permitted to accept jurisdiction over 
matters that are derivative of either an executive or legislative 
function.210 These courts are not capable of receiving a delega-
tion of the judicial functions constitutionally assigned to Article 
III—even if Congress or the courts consent to this delegation.211 
Thus conceived, these non-Article III courts are repositories of 
delegation of executive or legislative authority and operate only 
within areas not already constitutionally granted to the judici-
ary.212 This creates a sacrosanct core of Article III, in which 
Congress cannot strip the power of the constitutional courts in 
favor of a competing federal tribunal.  
Although this conception shields Article III from a power-
grab by the other branches—as the Constitution intended—it 
does not upend the existing administrative state. Legislative 
 
 208.  Chapman & McConnell, supra note 126, at 1704–05. 
 209. This conclusion from the perspective of dispute systems design but-
tresses the recent assertions of leading constitutional and federal courts schol-
ars, who argue that the original conception of Article III was consistent not 
only with the text of the Constitution, but also with the needs of the adminis-
trative state, and it remains—although buried—within today’s jurisprudence 
because of their inherent appeal. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 27, at 564–65. 
 210.  Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. (18 How.) at 280–81. 
 211.  Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450–51 (1929). 
 212.  Chapman & McConnell, supra note 126, at 1785–88. 
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courts, officers, and agencies can continue to apply law to fact 
as part of their executive or legislative functions, including 
with respect to newly created statutory rights.213  
Many non-Article III courts neatly fit within these con-
tours. But what about the existing doctrine’s willingness to al-
low any legislatively created right or any claim intertwined 
with a federal regulatory structure to be placed into one of the-
se tribunals?214 In contrast to existing doctrine, this approach 
would require Congress to expressly preempt any competing 
state or common law right and replace it with a federal right, if 
Congress sought to have these claims adjudicated before the 
tribunal. If Congress failed to do so, the claim would remain 
within the courts. Thus, to the extent that Congress seeks to 
make this forum an exclusive one, it must expressly state that 
the new federal regime displaces any existing rights at state or 
common law. This approach not only removes the often complex 
question of ascertaining which claims are truly intertwined 
with a federal regulatory structure but it also provides greater 
transparency with respect to the degree to which Congress in-
tends to displace pre-existing rights, its perception of whether 
dual forums are compatible with its substantive intent, and al-
lows public discourse on the matter.  
This perspective completely inverts the traditional consti-
tutional conception. No longer would Article III’s core functions 
be subject to removal by Congress, as exists under the current 
doctrine. Under this approach, the Article III courts are able to 
retain their constitutionally granted functions and check the 
decisions of the legislative and executive branches—including 
those of legislative courts and agency adjudicators—
unmolested by Congress. While Congress has the Constitution-
al authority to make exceptions to the courts’ jurisdiction, leav-
ing matters in the state courts or providing limited federal 
courts, Congress is incapable of withdrawing this core jurisdic-
tion in favor of its own system of courts that lack Article III 
protections.  
As a result, this approach provides far greater protection 
against encroachment upon the Article III courts and their 
functions. Indeed, because certain claims must reside in the Ar-
ticle III courts if they are brought within the federal courts at 
all, the delegation approach encourages innovation not only in 
 
 213.  Id. 
 214. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2612–15 (2011) (reviewing the cas-
es comprising the doctrine). 
DODGE_5fmt 1/25/2015 1:04 PM 
2015] NON-ARTICLE III TRIBUNALS 957 
 
Article I courts but also Article III courts. From this perspec-
tive, legislative courts and agency proceedings may actually 
come to serve as a laboratory for innovation, a proving ground 
for new procedural innovations to be tested in a narrow area 
before incorporating them into the full panoply of Article III 
courts. 
Finally, this approach neatly provides for a basis for collat-
eral review of the cases, without requiring direct appeal—and 
thus avoids the problem of either invalidating a substantial 
number of existing administrative structures or allowing en-
croachment upon the structural role of the Article III courts. 
The other branches continue to retain their full authority to 
delegate their own functions, to the extent already permitted 
by the doctrine. At the same time, because the delegation ap-
proach protects the core role of the Article III courts and pro-
vides for constitutional oversight of the Article I courts through 
the existing system of checks and balances, there is no need for 
a subjective balancing test. This approach then substantially 
frees Congress to craft innovative dispute resolution procedures 
as part of the legislative and executive functions—but not to 
innovate away the individual’s right to judicial determination 
of core private disputes, nor to constitutionally challenge the 
actions of the legislative or executive tribunals.  
C. IMPLICATIONS FOR JURISDICTION-STRIPPING DOCTRINE AND 
SCHOLARSHIP 
It is well established that non-Article III courts operate 
“merely in aid of legislative or executive action” and are “inca-
pable” of receiving the power of the Article III courts.215 It is 
thus in this sphere, in which a matter could be determined ex-
clusively by Congress pursuant to its powers under Article I or 
the Executive pursuant to its powers under Article II, that non-
Article III courts can constitutionally operate.216 To the extent 
that decision-making authority is delegated to an executive of-
ficer or legislative court, the role of the judiciary is not to ques-
tion the necessity of the delegation or the wisdom of investing 
 
 215.  Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. at 450–51. 
 216.  Id. at 453 (“The matters made cognizable [in non-Article III tribunals] 
include nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determina-
tion. On the contrary, all are matters which are susceptible of legislative or 
executive determination and can have no other save under and in conformity 
with permissive legislation by Congress.”). 
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the power in another branch rather than the judiciary.217 In-
stead, the role of the judiciary is solely to determine whether 
the delegation was lawfully made.218 If the delegation is lawful, 
the determination made becomes an executive or legislative 
act—not a judicial one. The decision is binding even in a pri-
vate rights case, as “the action of the executive power, upon a 
matter committed to its determination by the constitution and 
laws is conclusive.”219  
To this point, the doctrine and the insights of this Article 
agree. But here the agreement ends.  
In recent decades, the Supreme Court has gone further, 
permitting a non-Article III tribunal to hear core private rights 
matters that are “intertwined” with the public rights or private 
privileges being adjudicated by the tribunal.220 This doctrine 
permits Congress to remove jurisdiction of not only public 
rights but also intertwined claims within the core ambit of Ar-
ticle III—common law and equitable claims—in favor of non-
Article III tribunals.  
This expansion follows from the Court’s approach to Article 
III: the doctrine is structured as permitting Congress to remove 
claims at its will to further an identified substantive aim, so 
long as the claim involves a right “integrally related to a par-
ticular federal government action”—whether because the claim 
is derived from a federal regulatory scheme or merely because 
resolution by an agency is “deemed essential to a limited regu-
latory objective within the agency’s authority.”221 Having ac-
cepted the ability of Congress to assign matters to a non-Article 
III court in the furtherance of its legislative scheme, the Court 
reasoned that retaining jurisdiction over intertwined common 
law claims would “emasculate if not destroy” the regime, as bi-
furcation would “realistically mean that the courts, not the 
agency” would become the sole forum for the entire dispute.222  
The Court justified its extension of de facto “supplemental” 
jurisdiction to these agency adjudications and legislative court 
proceedings in purely pragmatic terms. But the Court’s doc-
 
 217. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 283–85 (1855). 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Id. at 284–85.  
 220. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 856 
(1986). 
 221. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613–14 (2011). 
 222. Schor, 478 U.S. at 844 (citations omitted). 
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trine also suggests a broader animating theme, which parallels 
the traditional concepts of comity and abstention. The initial 
impetus of the doctrine is one analogous to comity—there are 
areas in which claims can be formulated as alternatively ame-
nable to judicial, legislative, or executive determination. Within 
this area of overlap, the Court defers to the decision of Con-
gress as to which branch is most suitable to make the determi-
nation, as a mechanism for permitting furtherance of the legis-
lature’s substantive policy goals, absent any indicia of 
constitutional violation (namely encroachment or aggrandize-
ment at the expense of the structural role of Article III).223  
To the extent that a particular substantive regime is inter-
twined with a particular state or common law claim, if the par-
ties consent, the Court functionally abstains from resolving the 
intertwined claim that would otherwise be within its jurisdic-
tion, in favor of permitting the non-Article III court to resolve 
the entire dispute. This abstention is necessary given that “re-
alistically . . . the courts, not the agency, will end up” deciding 
the claims, which would undermine Congress’s purpose in cre-
ating the non-Article III forum.224 In embracing abstention in 
favor of competing federal courts, the Court readily recognized 
that “wholesale importation of concepts of pendent or ancillary 
jurisdiction into the agency context may create greater consti-
tutional difficulties, [but] we decline to endorse an absolute 
prohibition on such jurisdiction out of fear of where some hypo-
thetical ‘slippery slope’ may deposit us.”225 
But is abstention by the Article III courts in favor of other 
federal tribunals permitted by the Constitution?  
The answer seems to clearly be no. Indeed, to admit of this 
power to abstain in favor of non-Article III courts creates a 
queer constitutional notion: Article III judges cannot delegate 
the power to issue final judgments in core Article III matters to 
non-Article III judges.226 Nor can Congress remove jurisdiction 
 
 223. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 
589 (1985) (noting the “pragmatic understanding” that “the danger of en-
croaching on the judicial powers is reduced” where the matter could also have 
been conclusively determined by the executive or legislative branches). 
 224. Schor, 478 U.S. at 844. 
 225. Id. at 852.  
 226. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2619 (rejecting the argument that the appoint-
ment of bankruptcy judges by the Article III courts makes the arrangement 
constitutional, “it does not matter who appointed the bankruptcy judge or au-
thorized the judge to render final judgments . . . [t]he constitutional bar re-
mains”). 
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over these core matters in favor of a non-Article III court.227 Yet, 
Article III judges can functionally abstain from hearing these 
precise matters in favor of non-Article III judges, if the tribunal 
is already hearing an intertwined matter.228 From where does 
this authority constitutionally flow, if neither Congress nor the 
courts have this power? 
This distinction has powerful real world consequences. As 
the Roberts Court noted, if an “exercise of judicial power 
may . . . be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by deem-
ing it part of some amorphous ‘public right,’ then Article III 
would be transformed from the guardian of individual liberty 
and separation of powers we have long recognized into mere 
wishful thinking.”229 Indeed, to the extent that the current doc-
trine defines a public right as one which fulfills a public pur-
pose—and this is, in turn, defined as a matter about which 
Congress cares enough to devise a particularized substantive 
regime230—Article III’s structural purposes collapse: the very 
matters about which Congress is most concerned become those 
as to which the structural checks imposed are at their mini-
mum. For many, it may be no answer that the statute must be 
narrowly tailored. Indeed, it may be that a narrow statute is 
even more troubling, as it reveals an intent to remove a partic-
ular type of dispute from the Article III courts, suggesting a de-
sire to shield a particular type of dispute from the constitution-
al protections of Article III.  
But more fundamentally, there is no textual basis within 
the Constitution for this distinction: “Article III of the Consti-
tution provides that the judicial power of the United States 
may be vested only in courts whose judges enjoy the protections 
set forth in that Article.”231 Indeed, the Roberts Court itself 
acknowledged that “[a] statute may no more lawfully chip away 
at the authority of the Judicial Branch than it may eliminate it 
entirely. ‘Slight encroachments create new boundaries from 
which legions of power can seek new territory to capture.’”232 If 
this is the case, a doctrine that permits the other branches to 
 
 227. Id. at 2614–15. 
 228. Id. at 2618 (discussing the constitutionality of congressional statutes 
permitting non-Article III courts to decide even core Article III matters that 
would “necessarily be resolved” in the adjudication of statutory claims). 
 229. Id. at 2615. 
 230.  Id. at 2611–15.  
 231. Id. at 2620.  
 232. Id. (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957) (plurality opinion)).  
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narrowly transfer core Article III jurisdiction over common law 
matters cannot stand.  
Does this consign litigants unlucky enough to have both 
state or common law claims and federal statutory claims to 
endless and potentially contradictory proceedings? No. Decades 
ago, with the explosion of arbitration, a similar problem 
arose.233 Parties discovered their arbitration clauses covered 
certain disputes, while others were not covered and thus would 
be subject to litigation.234 The Supreme Court unsympathetical-
ly responded that the problem lay with the drafters and that it 
would enforce the bifurcated proceedings.235 As a practical mat-
ter, this was quickly resolved as parties began drafting provi-
sions broad enough to place all the claims in the preferred fo-
rum. 
This lesson applies equally to Congress. The current doc-
trine imputes a legislative preference for depriving the individ-
ual of his right to a judicial forum and the capacity to remove a 
core private right from the structural limits otherwise imposed 
upon this removal. In so doing, Congress is then able to engage 
in implied jurisdiction-stripping, through the mere passage of 
the related statutory right and designation of non-Article III 
adjudication. In many cases, this may impair the ordinary 
democratic checks imposed upon jurisdiction-stripping, which 
have generally proven quite powerful, because the loss of juris-
diction appears nowhere on the face of the statute.  
The insights of this Article suggest support for the argu-
ment that this slippery slope is unnecessary: Congress is not 
prohibited from expressly removing these cases, but if Congress 
wants to remove the right to a judicial forum, its determination 
must be subject to the front-end democratic checks created by 
the Constitution by requiring an express, rather than implied, 
removal of this sacrosanct right.236  
 
 233. See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985). 
 234.  See id. at 214–15. 
 235. See id. at 217 (“[T]he Arbitration Act requires district courts to compel 
arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion 
to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance 
of separate proceedings in different forums.”). 
 236. Congress may choose to do this by expressly preempting state or 
common law causes of action, in favor of the federal statutory right. The feder-
al compensation and damages may be calculated in the same manner for all 
claimants, creating nationwide harmonization—rather than having pockets of 
higher or lower relative compensation based upon variation in state law. But 
the compensation structure could also be set as a formula that incorporates 
any damages that would otherwise have been available at state law. Or the 
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D. INHERENT APPELLATE REVIEW 
Many of the nation’s leading federal courts scholars have 
chaffed at the ability of Congress to remove cases from the Ar-
ticle III courts and simultaneously limit or even entirely pre-
clude Article III appeal.237 It is from this troubling notion that 
both the appellate review and inferior tribunals models 
stemmed.238 Yet, the Court has not yet adopted either of these 
models, perhaps out of a concern with the extent to which these 
theories would invalidate existing structures or reshape the 
role of the constitutional courts.  
Returning to the areas in which non-Article III courts offer 
systemic benefits and the derivative observation as to the ap-
propriate scope of these tribunals, an alternative conception 
emerges—a conception consistent with the Court’s intuition 
about the role of the constitutional courts, but one that invali-
dates no tribunal. 
Non-Article III courts operate “merely in aid of legislative 
or executive action” and are “incapable” of receiving the power 
of the Article III courts.239 It is thus in this sphere in which a 
matter could be determined exclusively by Congress pursuant 
to its powers under Article I or the executive pursuant to its 
powers under Article II that non-Article III courts can constitu-
tionally operate.240 To the extent that decision-making authori-
ty is delegated to an executive officer or legislative court, the 
role of the judiciary is not to question the necessity of the dele-
gation or the wisdom of investing the power in another branch 
rather than the judiciary.241 Instead the role of the judiciary is 
 
remedies could be a hybrid of the various approaches, incorporate a minimum 
penalty, or otherwise be modified to obtain the precise levels of compensation 
and deterrence Congress prefers. The very degree of variation possible in cre-
ating these remedies suggests that this is a decision best suited to the political 
branches and that our Article III structure should encourage the legislature to 
undertake these considerations. 
 237. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 27, at 1500–01 (“[T]he issues implicated by 
the jurisdiction-stripping debate go to the very heart of the role of the federal 
courts in our constitutional order.”). 
 238. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
 239. Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 450–51 (1929). 
 240. Id. at 453 (“The matters made cognizable [in non-Article III tribunals] 
include nothing which inherently or necessarily requires judicial determina-
tion. On the contrary, all are matters which are susceptible of legislative or 
executive determination and can have no other save under and in conformity 
with permissive legislation by Congress.”). 
 241. Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 
How.) 272, 283–85 (1855). 
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solely to determine whether the delegation was lawfully 
made.242  
If the delegation is lawful, one might posit that the deter-
mination made becomes an executive or legislative act—not a 
judicial one. The decision is binding even in a private rights 
case, as “the action of the executive power, upon a matter com-
mitted to its determination by the constitution and laws is con-
clusive.”243 However, as a legislative or executive action, one 
could argue that, to the extent that the decision is unconstitu-
tional, it is subject to collateral attack within the Article III 
courts—even if the statute makes no such express statement—
as is any other governmental act. Application of this standard 
allows for the executive and legislative branches to exercise 
their full powers as designated within the Constitution, with-
out any greater or lesser review than applies to other actions.  
Recognizing this principle avoids the strategic incentive to 
delegate authority as a mechanism for avoiding constitutional 
scrutiny, by preventing Congress from insulating its decisions 
through a delegation to a non-Article III tribunal paired with a 
provision barring direct appellate review. So too, it prevents 
Congress from impeding the courts through a mandate of ex-
treme deference, including precluding the courts from review-
ing any factual determinations or limiting a challenge to legal 
errors, manifest disregard, or instances of bribery, for example. 
Rather, the underlying right of access to the courts to challenge 
an unconstitutional determination would remain, regardless of 
the direct appellate review permissively granted by Congress. 
This approach thus creates a baseline level of constitutional 
protection, which cannot be subverted by Congress—in contrast 
with the substantial questions raised by the treatment of appel-
late review under the existing doctrine.  
By enshrining the Article III courts as the constitutional 
guarantors and eschewing the right of the other branches to 
remove the judiciary’s power, this approach is consistent with 
the checks and balances that the Constitution sought to struc-
turally guarantee. But it also restricts the aggrandizement of 
the courts, preventing Article III judges from exercising greater 
review over the other branches’ exercise of their assigned enu- 
 
 
 
 242. Id.  
 243. Id. at 284–85.  
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merated powers simply because they incorporate some degree 
of application of fact to law.  
 
* * * 
 
The embrace of alternative dispute resolution and proce-
dural design animated the current generation of Article III doc-
trine. The result has been self-admittedly chaotic and unpre-
dictable, risking incursion upon the remaining remnants of 
Article III’s core. It may thus be fitting that returning to these 
foundations offers a new set of insights that has the potential 
to set us on the path to resolving the intractable paradox of Ar-
ticle III. This Part has simply taken the first step, identifying 
some of the potential insights and implications of this Article 
for some of the leading theories of Article III.  
It remains for the Court and scholars to decide which of the 
competing theories is the best fit. But with the new insights of 
this Article, many of the leading theories begin to coalesce 
around a common view of Article III. A few hard cases in which 
reasonable minds may differ about whether a particular deter-
mination is an act that can only be taken by the judiciary, do of 
course remain. The insights of this Article do not claim to re-
solve this debate; rather, they lower the stakes, returning vital-
ity to the constitutional checks and balances such that an erro-
neous approval of a non-Article III tribunal does far less 
violence to the constitutional role and protections of Article III.  
 CONCLUSION  
Far from their modest foundations, today’s non-Article III 
tribunals adjudicate far more cases than our constitutional 
courts. Congress has readily turned to these tribunals to han-
dle some of our nation’s most important and complex dis-
putes—at times, removing the cases from the constitutional 
courts to avoid the outcomes that Congress expressly expected 
would be reached in an Article III court. Such actions stand in 
sharp juxtaposition to the common conception of the role of Ar-
ticle III in ensuring an independent judiciary, free from politi-
cal influence. 
The premise upon which this expansion rested is, this Arti-
cle has argued, contravened by the structure of the courts 
themselves. This insight fundamentally reshapes the debate 
over Article III: the procedural design reasons for which we 
abandoned the early doctrine—and have since criticized the 
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myriad of categorical tests—were incorrect. And, the procedur-
al reasons supporting the new balancing test were equally er-
roneous.  
But, if the modern doctrine’s assumptions are wrong, this 
provides us with an opportunity to revisit the questions of Arti-
cle III anew. This Article has argued that the original intuition 
of a sacrosanct core of Article III is not—in contrast to existing 
doctrine and substantial scholarship—inherently in conflict 
with our modern administrative state from the perspective of 
procedural systems design. For categorical-approach propo-
nents, this insight provides a strong argument in support of 
workability—but also necessitates revisiting which of the many 
Article III theories best vindicates Article III and the broader 
constitutional system. For scholars that support the balancing 
approach, this insight is not a death knell, but instead a call for 
retrenchment, seeking new, valid bases for the test.  
This Article takes an important first step in this reconcep-
tualization by dispelling the myth of the paradox of Article III. 
No longer must the constitutional protections secured by Arti-
cle III remain at risk in order to permit legislative innovation 
or accurate substantive law enforcement. We can have both a 
modern administrative state and a set of core Article III protec-
tions, insulated once again from political encroachment. In 
short, the impossible may not be so impossible after all. 
